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ABSTRACT: The protection of intellectual property rights and its limits has spurred 
controversy in the standardization ecosystem in recent times. While conflicting interests in 
standard-setting abound over a wide range of pertinent aspects, considerations regarding the 
inclusion and subsequent treatment of proprietary elements in a technical standard hold the 
lion’s share of concerns that Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) have to deal with. 
These concerns revolve around the balance between the interests of innovators and 
implementers of new technologies. In this respect, SDOs adopt patent policies, which members 
have to observe in order to participate in SDOs’ activities. Similarly to other rules governing 
the work of SDOs, patent policies may be modified following the prescribed procedures. 
However, any subsequent changes to an organization’s operational framework, including its 
intellectual property rules, may distort prior expectations and lock in members to rules that 
they never intended to abide by. Against this backdrop, this Article seeks to explore how SDOs’ 
members respond to the amendments of intellectual property rules by offering a taxonomy of 
strategies that may be adopted by members opposing modifications based on the exit and voice 
theory by Hirschman (1970). Drawing upon the example of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) revised Patent Policy, which took effect in 2015, the Article 
explores how SDO members respond to instances of organizational distress such as an update 
of intellectual property policies within an SDO, using as proxies stakeholders’ willingness to 
commit to the new licensing rules and previous examples of strategies when misunderstandings 
around intellectual property arose. At a normative level, this Article further studies the effect 
that such changes may have on the nature and structure of a given industry and offers a novel 
classification of reactions to turning points in the standards development realm, thereby 
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Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) have been in troubled waters in recent 
times. Lately, the simmering tensions are growing steadily. In the US, participants in several 
SDOs complain that their views, positions and interests are not duly taken into account in the 
SDO’s decision-making process.  
For instance, only last year NSS Labs filed before the US district court in Northern 
California an antitrust suit against the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization 
(AMTSO) as well as CrowdStrike, Symantec and ESET, which are some of the most important 
anti-virus (so-called ‘endpoint protection’ or EPP) product vendors and AMTSO members.1 
AMTSO is a non-profit organization created in 2008 by 25 companies, which currently has 
over 60 members. Its membership encompasses the most important players in the cybersecurity 
industry, including both vendors and testing labs. AMTSO’s main objective is to improve the 
business conditions regarding the development, use, testing and rating of anti-malware 
products and solutions. Big tech companies such as Symantec, McAfee and Microsoft but also 
cybersecurity-based companies such as CarbonBlack, CrowdStrike, Kaspersky Lab and 
FireEye participate actively in AMTSO.  
Whereas NSS Labs is an AMTSO member, it argues that the defendants conspired against 
the antivirus product testing industry to prevent independent testing of EPP products by 
adopting in May 2018 an AMTSO standard, which entails a testing protocol for anti-malware 
products.2 NSS Labs claims that AMTSO’s practices unduly favor the interests of vendors, 
which is then reflected in the testing protocol standard that AMTSO produced. More 
specifically, NSS labs accused the defendants of conspiring to effectively implement a group 
boycott, as vendors can rely on the newly adopted AMTSO standard to deny testing by those 
testing companies which do not comply with that standard. This refusal to deal is bound to hurt 
independent testing services providers, according to the complainant. Being the result of the 
standard, the group boycott has the effect of unreasonably restraining competition in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as AMTSO is dominated by the EPP vendors which 
outnumber the testing companies.3 Furthermore, AMTSO also has a problematic voting rule 
which, in its quest for balancing, may not be in line with the basic voting principle of consensus 
                                                   
 
1 NSS Labs, Inc. v. CrowdStrike, Inc.; Symantec Corporation; ESET, LLC; Anti-Malware Testing Standards 
Organization, Inc.; and Does 1-50, Inclusive, No. 5:18-CV-05711-BLF. 
2 See https://www.amtso.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AMTSO-Testing-Protocol-Standard-for-the-
Testing-of-Anti-Malware-Solutions-v1.0.pdf (accessed on 3 August 2019). The relevant standard was 
updated in June 2019: https://www.amtso.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/AMTSO-Testing-Protocol-
Standard-for-the-Testing-of-Anti-Malware-Solutions-v1.2.pdf (accessed 3 August 2019). 
3 AMTSO admitted that this indeed is the case: NSS Labs, Inc. v. CrowdStrike, Inc.; Symantec Corporation; 
ESET, LLC; Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization, Inc.; and Does 1-50, Inclusive, No. 5:18-CV-
05711-BLF, Doc. 51, AMTSO’s Motion to Dismiss, at 5. 




that permeates standard-setting.4 In NSS Labs’ view, even if the restraint’s negative impact on 
competition is not regarded as per se unlawful, a rule of reason analysis would still demonstrate 
that AMTSO’s practices (and, in fact, its very existence) impose an unreasonable restraint on 
competition and has no pro-competitive effect. The US Department of Justice also intervened 
in the case in June 2019.5 The DoJ’s statement of interest urges the District Court to review 
AMTSO’s mechanics and fundamentals, as it also has doubts regarding the balancing of the 
relevant interests is made in practice within that SDO. Clearly, a lot is at stake from a market 
and a legal viewpoint alike: adequate and independent testing of antivirus products can uncover 
security vulnerabilities, whereas the DoJ would not welcome a judgment that allows for 
concealing potential antitrust violations within an organization that aspires to set standard in 
this sensitive market.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, no less tension is to be observed. The recent introduction 
of the Standardization Regulation in 20126 has instigated policy reforms relating to 
standardization within the EU and allegedly paved the way for a more inclusive approach 
towards standard-setting.7 However, due process and inclusiveness in the standardization 
processes is more easily said than done, whereas incumbents in the standardization process 
may be incentivized to make use of their power in a standardization body.  
In Fra.bo,8 for instance, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had to review 
a claim by an Italian company against a standard regarding copper fittings adopted by a private 
SDO (the Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches – DVGW) which would require 
that the elastomeric waterproof joints of fittings had to withstand an immersion test in boiling 
water for 3’000 hours. Fra.bo had complied with the previous standard but failed to comply 
with the new requirement. Importantly, Fra.bo was not involved in the promulgation of the 
standard. In addition, it did not apply for additional certification by DVGW within three months 
after the entry into force of the amendment, as required by the DVGW procedure in place. As 
Fra.bo did not meet the additional requirement imposed, it could not receive the necessary 
compliance certificate from DVGW, which, according to German law, was required in order 
for Fra.bo to get access to the German market.9 Several years earlier, in the Pre-insulated pipes 
case, the European Commission had fined a large-scale cartel in the market of pre-insulated 
pipes because the relevant companies had established a private body which was tasked with 
                                                   
 
4 According to AMTSO’s bylaws, a decision is taken if 50 percent of the vendor companies and 50 percent 
of the testing companies vote for the proposal. However, typically SSOs would require a super-majority of 
at least 70 percent of the entire membership for a standard to be adopted. 
5 NSS Labs, Inc. v. CrowdStrike, Inc.; Symantec Corporation; ESET, LLC; Anti-Malware Testing Standards 
Organization, Inc.; and Does 1-50, Inclusive, No. 5:18-CV-05711-BLF, Doc. 91, Statement of Interest of 
the United States. 
6 Regulation 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Oct. 25, 2012) O.J. (L 316) 12 
[hereinafter: EU Standardization Regulation]. 
7 See P. Delimatsis, Standardisation in Services – European Ambitions and Sectoral Realities, 41 EUROPEAN 
LAW REVIEW 4 (2016), 513, at 528.  
8 CJEU Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:453. 
9 See also Harm Schepel, Between standards and regulation – On the concept of ‘de facto mandatory 
standards’ after Tuna II and Fra.bo, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDIZATION (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015).    




the creation of standards which would delay the introduction of new technological methods 
which were manifestly bound to reduce the prices of the relevant products. In addition, these 
companies agreed to impose a collective boycott by refusing to supply to a competitor, when 
the latter was granted a big district-heating contract in Germany.10 
Finally, international courts also dealt with the implications that procedural deficiencies 
may have on the legality and legal value of a given standard promulgated at the national or 
regional level. In US-Tuna II, for instance, the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) also reviewed the operating procedures of a regional SDO to find that an 
SDO with a ‘by invitation only’ policy of participation is not a body that adheres to the principle 
of openness, which is a fundamental aspect of due process within SDOs, thus denying the 
possibility for this SDO to establish international standards within the meaning of the WTO 
agreement on technical barriers to trade.11 
The antitrust lawsuit by NSS Labs and the other cases adjudicated before European and 
international courts bring to the forefront several recurring issues of organizational, 
institutional and procedural issues common to the functioning of SDOs where competitors 
interact in the quest for the best technology but also, inevitably, dominance. Regarding 
procedures in particular, some SDO members may claim that insufficient procedural 
safeguards are in place that undermine the SDO’s objective to achieve a pro-competitive 
industry consensus. Rather, vested interests and power dynamics within the institution, coupled 
with weak governance rules (or unfair enforcement thereof) can create fertile ground for the 
creation of a cartel that disfavors certain members (for instance, via a group boycott in US 
antitrust parlance or concerted action that amounts to a restriction by object in the EU 
competition parlance) for the benefit of the few dressed in the garb of standard-setting. Indeed, 
the importance of procedural fairness within SDOs has been previously recognized by US 
Courts, which have acknowledged the existence of economic incentives for SDO participants 
to restrain competition but also confirmed the pro-competitive benefits of standardization.12 
                                                   
 
10 European Commission’s Decision 1999/60/EC relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the Treaty 
[now 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] – Case No IV/35.691/E-4: Pre-insulated 
Pipe Cartel) (January 1, 1999), O.J. (L 24) 1. The decision was subsequently appealed without success: 
Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:408. 
11 See P. Delimatsis, Global Standard-Setting 2.0: How the WTO Spotlights ISO and Impacts the 
Transnational Standard-Setting Process, 28 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
273 (2018). 
12 US Supreme Court, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc, 486 U.S. 492, 500, 401, 511 (1988).  




According to the relevant legislation in the US13 and the EU,14 SDOs are required to secure 
a proper balancing of interests in their function. Previous studies have scrutinized theoretically 
and empirically the dynamics that develop within an institutional setting of this type and 
underscored the difficulty of ensuring in practice and over time that technological rationality 
will always prevail in the decision-making process of an SDO.15 However, very little academic 
research has looked into the strategies used by firms to overcome what they consider as glitches 
in the standardization processes of a given SDO that undermine the ‘balancing of interests’ 
requirement. Typically, like in most organizations, such complaints will arise either when the 
rules of the game are amended or when a given (controversial) standard is adopted by the SDO. 
In that case, it appears that firms have three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) options: the 
first is to litigate; the second is to work with their counterparts within the organization to 
address their concerns; and the third is to exit the organization and strive for building a new 
coalition that protects their interests better. The third option, but, arguably, all of three of them, 
will be the result of a meticulous cost-benefit analysis.16 However, the endogenous flexibility 
of an institutional setting may create the necessary and sufficient conditions for continuous 
trust in a particular organization.  
Whereas several SDO rules may spur controversy, a highly contentious topic in the realm 
of standardization has been the way certain SDOs protect intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
While standards development evinces an array of conflicting interests, considerations 
regarding the inclusion and subsequent treatment of proprietary elements in a technical 
standard hold the lion’s share of concerns that SDOs have to grapple with.  Balancing of 
interests, notably in IP-intensive technological areas, is everything but a walkover: when 
charging excessive licensing fees or attempting to distort standard-setting processes through 
essential patent claims (that is, claiming that one’s patent is essential for a given standard), 
patent-holders effectively prevent access to the standard and arguably use their technological 
supremacy to the detriment of innovation. On the  other hand, the use of patented components 
without guaranteeing proper remuneration for patent-holders weakens their incentives to invest 
                                                   
 
13 The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act (SDOAA) of 2004 defines an SDO as an 
organization that “plans, develops, establishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards using 
procedures that incorporate the attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, 
and consensus in a manner consistent with the Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A-119, 
as revised February 10, 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8). Balance of interests would require that a meaningful 
involvement from a broad range of parties exist, with no single interest dominating the decision-making. See 
Office of Mgmt.& Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Circular No. A-119 § 2e(ii), as revised 
January 27, 2016.  
14 See EU Standardization Regulation, recital 2; also European Commission Communication, Guidelines on 
the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-
operation agreements (14 January 2011), O.J. (C 11) 1, paras 277ff. 
15 See T. Büthe and W. Mattli, Setting International Standards – Technological Rationality or Primacy of 
Power? 56 WORLD POLITICS (2003), 1. S. Greenstein and V. Stango (eds), STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(2006); M. Weiss and M. Sirbu, Technology choice in voluntary standards committee: An empirical analysis, 
1 INNOVATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY (1990), 111; R. Lampe and P. Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage 
Innovation? Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal, NBER Working Paper 18316, 2012; and 
Delimatsis, supra note 11. 
16 Cf. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, A Model of Forum Shopping, 96 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 4, 1091 
(2006). 




in research and development (hereinafter: R&D) and to contribute to standards development, 
thereby risking constraining technological progress.  
To alleviate possible antitrust concerns while offering adequate compensation for patent-
holders, SDOs adopt formal policies that govern matters related to IPR issues and the 
incorporation of patented technologies into standards. Along with statutes and working 
procedures, these patent policies form an integral part of SDOs’ operational framework: their 
acceptance is a passage obligé for companies to join SDOs’ standard-setting activities.17 In 
principle, and given that these policies aim to strike a balance between conflicting interests of 
technology vendors and implementers to avoid potential ‘wars of attrition’,18 SDOs’ 
intellectual property rules should be clear and well-constructed to allow for their unambiguous 
interpretation. A poorly designed patent policy creates ambiguities, which undermines legal 
certainty among SDOs’ participants and may even create fertile grounds for antitrust violations, 
eventually resulting in undesirable and lengthy litigation.19 In a similar vein, any modifications 
to the SDOs’ patent policy, even when deemed necessary in the light of market developments, 
may impinge upon the understanding of terms of acceptance for SDO membership and the 
foundational basis for the decision-making, possibly giving rise to discontentment among those 
who joined based on expectations juxtaposed against the initial repertoire of rules.  
Against this backdrop, this Article seeks to explore how SDO members respond to 
instances of organizational distress such as an amendment of IPR rules within an SDO. More 
specifically, we use the ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ framework of Hirschman (1970) to identify 
a taxonomy of voice and exit strategies for dissatisfied SDO members. By drawing on the 
example of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a leading SDO of 
global reach,20 the Article studies the effect that a turning moment (from an organizational 
viewpoint) within an SDO may have on the behavior of participants but also, by implication, 
on the overall performance on an SDO.  
                                                   
 
17 Note that in most cases, patent policies do not necessarily imply that the participants should make licensing 
commitments: they remain free to choose not to license their technologies. A handful of SDOs nevertheless 
sets the requirement to commit to license as a condition of participation. See JRC report analysing VITA, 
W3C, JEDEC, ECMA and DVB Project)  Justus Baron; Jorge Contreras; Martin Husovec; and Pierre 
Larouche, ‘Making the Rules – The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies 
on Intellectual Property Rights’ (hereinafter 'The JRC Report', 2019, at 45, available at:  
<http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC115004/sdo_governance_final_electronic_ve
rsion.pdf> (accessed 25 June 2019). 
18 Joseph Farrell and Timothy Simcoe, Choosing the rules for consensus standardization, 43 RAND 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 2 (2012), 235. 
19 An example where the alleged ambiguity of IP rules was closely associated with antitrust violations is the 
Rambus case: In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev'd, 522 F.3d 456 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
20 With over 423,000 members worldwide, IEEE is the largest technical professional organization: see 
https://www.ieee.org/about/index.html (last accessed March 24, 2019). Through its Major Boards, including 
the IEEE Standards Association, the Institute engages in numerous activities with the purpose of fostering 
technological advancement. IEEE Constitution and Bylaws 2019, https://www.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
org/ieee/web/org/ieee-constitution-and-bylaws.pdf, Section. I-107. The board of any organizational unit, 
referred to as Major Boards listed in IEEE Bylaw I-303, shall be deemed to be a Committee of IEEE within 
the meaning of the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (last accessed March 24, 2019). 




The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Section II deciphers the importance of patent 
policies in standardization activities, paving the way for Section III where we discuss the 
challenges that an SDO has to face when it revisits its patent policy, taking the example of the 
controversial modification of the IEEE patent policy. It further discusses recent studies that 
sketch the short-term impact of the revision on standardization activity within the IEEE SA 
based on the number of patent declarations submitted before and after the new policy took 
effect. The discussion takes into account that, in view of the recent change, no definite 
conclusion can be drawn as regards the long-term consequences of the new policy. Section IV 
introduces Hirschman’s conceptual framework with a view to better understanding strategies 
and practices within SDOs in challenging times triggered by a policy change or unsatisfactory 
performance. The main part of the Article, Section IV, maps the strategies that the patent-
holders may adopt in the case that the revised policy is perceived to be not catering to their 
interests: (1) setting up an informal consortium outside SDO’s working group and offer a 
standard developed within that consortium for a fast-track adoption by the SDO at issue; (2) 
refuse to comply with the new licensing rules; (3) delay or interrupt a standards development 
process due to vague or arbitrary licensing requirements; and (4) litigate. The option and 
ensuing costs of exit is also discussed, in an attempt to offer a taxonomy of strategies within 
SDOs in an orderly manner. Finally, the article identifies steps that an SDO could undertake 
with a view to mitigating and avoiding such a conundrum under this scenario. Crucially, when 
reviewing the potential strategies and scenarios, we also shed light on the role that competition 
and other public authorities can play in this equation. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF PATENT POLICIES IN STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES 
SDOs develop standards that contribute to technical advancement in their field of expertise. 
To achieve their mission, SDOs’ processes strive to balance the divergent interests of their 
heterogeneous membership: after all, most SDOs are expected to offer standard developers a 
neutral forum for cooperation. The fulfillment of such an undertaking necessitates that the rules 
and procedures governing standards development do not favor any particular group of 
contributors, but rather aim to avert or mitigate potential conflicts of interests. From that 
perspective, consensus building is typically seen as a mechanism to prevent standards 
development processes from resulting in biased or even discriminatory outcomes, as well to 
ensure the wide-scale adoption of standards.21  
Contrary to standards development processes, decisions on SDOs’ operational framework 
are not always carried out by consensus; consequently, a patent policy may not necessarily 
represent a “general consensus” among SDO’s members and participants,22 but be a product of 
                                                   
 
21 For the advantages of consensus-based standard development, see T. Simcoe, Standard Setting 
Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms, 102 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
1, 305 (2012); and J. Pelkmans, The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success Story, 8 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC POLICY 3, 432 (2001). 
22 Indeed, SDOs are generally membership-based, but some operate according to non-membership model 
(IETF) or allow technological contributions from non-members. See also Jorge Contreras, When a Stranger 




deliberations among the SDO’s leadership entrusted to develop rules and policies governing 
the SDOs’ activities. Generally, SDOs enjoy a greater freedom to design their rule-making 
process, as long as those do not contradict the applicable legislation: stakeholders joining 
particular SDOs are then presumed to have understood and agreed with their rules and 
processes. 
Yet, in the complex world of standard-setting, disagreements are virtually unavoidable, 
especially when the matter relates to IPR policies. While different approaches regarding the 
value of a certain technology abound across the industry, avoiding conflicts arising from IP-
related issues in a standard or technical specification is one of the essential missions of any 
resilient SDO. In particular, this applies to organizations operating in the sphere of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) and developing solutions for technological 
interoperability, including specifications for internet architecture and wireless connectivity 
systems. Such standards often rely on technologies protected by patents whose usage requires 
the “permission” of patent-holders, typically granted in the form of licenses. Without a valid 
license, any implementation of a patented component (and hence of the standard based on that 
component) will infringe the relevant IPR claim and deprive the patent-holder of its right to 
remuneration. On the other hand, when charging excessive licensing fees or strategically raise 
essential patent claims, theory would suggest that patent-holders may effectively prevent 
access to the standard and abuse their technological supremacy.23 
Patent policies within SDOs typically address issues as terms of access to proprietary 
technologies, licensing commitments, disclosure and enforcement of essential patent claims. 
They form an integral part of SDOs’ statutory framework and, arguably, constitute an 
important insurance policy. They are binding upon their members and/or participants of their 
standardization activities.24 As in the case with all rules and procedures governing SDOs’ 
activities, patent policies should be clear and well-constructed to allow for their unambiguous 
interpretation. A policy fraught with ambiguities opens up avenues for undesirable conduct and 
                                                   
 
Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 12 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 3, 507 (2016). 
23 This may occur when patent-holders engage in value appropriation through strategic manoeuvring such 
as patent ambush or hold-up. For related discussions, see J. Farrell; J. Hayes; C. Sharipo; and T. Sullivan, 
Standard Setting, Patents and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 3 (2007) 603; M, Lemley and C. 
Shapiro, Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW  1991 (2007). That said, empirical 
evidence of patent hold-up is rather scarce, K. Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World, 9 
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (2013) 827; and A. Layne-Farrar, ‘Intellectual Property 
and Standard Setting’ (OECD Doc DAF/COMP/WD(2014)84, 18 November 2014); and A. Galetovic and 
S. Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory, 13 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 1 
(2017). 
24 To illustrate, Bekkers and Updegrove unveil binding commitments of patent policies of a number of SDOs, 
see R. Bekkers and A. Updegrove, ‘IPR Policies and Practices of a Representative of Standard-Setting 
Organizations Worldwide’, Report Commissioned by the Committee on Intellectual Property Management 
in Standard-Setting Processes. National Research Council, Washington, D.C. (May 2013), available at 
https://www.nap.edu/resource/18510/Bekkers-Updegrove%20Paper_092013.pdf (last accessed 24 March 
2019), at 35. In a recent dispute between TCL and Ericsson, the US District Court of California held in 
December 2017 that, under French law, a FRAND licensing commitment of ETSI Patent Policy should be 
seen as a contractual obligation for the benefit of a third party under common law, and is hence enforceable 
by Courts: TCL Communications v. Ericsson (SACV 14-341 JVS (DFMx) and CV 15-2370 JVS (DFMx).  




increased susceptibility to antitrust violations, potentially leading to lengthy litigation.25 This, 
however, does not prevent patent policies from being sufficiently flexible to adjust to the needs 
of SDOs’ membership and market or legal developments. 
In general, patent policies may: (a) require stakeholders to disclose patent claims that, to 
their knowledge, are infringed by the implementation of a standard (“disclosure obligation”); 
(b) oblige patent-holders to reveal their licensing terms prior to standard’s approval by an SDO 
(“ex ante disclosure of licensing terms”); and (c) to commit to license their proprietary 
technologies on (fair), reasonable and non-discriminator (“F/RAND”)26 or royalty-free terms 
(“licensing obligation”). A combination of disclosure and licensing obligations is not 
uncommon.27 While each of these requirements provoked both criticism and support from the 
industry, governments and academics,28 they intend to achieve the ambitious objective of 
providing rules of thumb that could potentially protect and balance the interests of both the 
patent-holders and patent-users, while shielding the SDO and its members from potential 
antitrust violations.  
A more  recent study on incentives of Standard Essential Patent (hereinafter: SEPs) holders 
to license their technology on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (hereinafter: FRAND) 
terms suggests that the value of incorporation of essential technologies into a standard depends 
on the SDOs’ reputation; in this regard, to anticipate whether SEP holders will comply with 
their licensing commitments they have given to other SDO’s participants, one should take into 
account that in high-tech industries, standard-setting process is often characterized by repeated 
interaction between SDO members.29 
                                                   
 
25 E.g. In re. Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C, Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). Industry representatives also mention confusing and opaque policies as one of the blocking 
factors for their effective participation in standards development, next to time and financial concerns. 
Interviews with industry representatives on January 16, 2018; January 25, 2018; and February 19, 2018; on 
file with the authors. 
26 In this Article, FRAND and RAND are used interchangeably.  
27 See J. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies on the 
Development  of Voluntary Technical Standards, conducted for the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), US  Department of Commerce (27 June 2011), available at 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nistgcr_11_934_empircalstudyofeffectsexantelicensing2011_0.pdf 
(last accessed 4 February 2019). 
28 See, among many others, U.S. Department of Justice & Federal trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement 
and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (April 2007), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf (last accessed 24 March 2019); J. Farrell et al, supra note 
23; S. Mutkoski, ‘Government Procurement Policy, Patent Royalties and the Myth of 'Discrimination' 
Against Free and Open Source Software Developers’, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1949832 (last accessed 24 March 2019); J. Tsai and 
J.D. Wright, ‘Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating 
Incomplete Contracts’ 80 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1, 157 (2015); Y. Ménière, Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing Terms. Research Analysis of a Controversial Concept. JRC Science and 
Policy Report (2015) available at 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96258/jrc96258.pdf (last accessed 24 March 
2019). A. Layne-Farrar, The Economics of FRAND, in ANTITRUST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HIGH 
TECH HANDBOOK (Daniel Sokol ed., 2017).  
29 See P. Larouche and F. Schuett, Repeated Interaction in Standard Setting, 28 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 3, 488 (2019); also G. Llanes, Ex-ante Agreements and FRAND 




Since many standards evolve over time, with several releases succeeding each other and 
building on the previous generations, repeated interaction create scope for participants to 
punish a contributor who misbehaved by voting against the inclusion of its technologies in the 
next generation of the standard, in fact allowing technology contributors to hold other 
contributors' market power in check and ensure compliance with FRAND commitments. The 
same study also demonstrated how the procedural rules of some SDOs affect the sustainability 
of an equilibrium with FRAND royalties by setting the super-majority requirement used by 
SDOs when voting on the adoption of technologies at a sufficiently demanding level and by 
discarding proposals that have not received the necessary super-majority. These empirical 
findings spark a further debate on how SDOs’ governance induce patent-holders to comply 
with their licensing commitments. 
Therefore, balanced patent policies are crucial to the successful development of standards 
of every SDO. To alleviate potential antitrust concerns ex ante while ensuring an adequate 
compensation for patent-holders, SDOs need to create and maintain a harmonious and 
collaborative environment for standardization activities by adopting an appropriate patent 
policy – a formal policy that governs matters related to IP and incorporation of patented 
elements into their standards. 
A vivid example of how the requirement to license standard-essential patents (SEPs) 
operates is provided by IEEE SA. Following IEEE SA’s patent policy, a patent-holder should, 
after having identified their technology as essential to (an) IEEE standard(s), submit a Letter 
of Assurance (LoA) asserting its licensing intentions.30 A patent-holder can choose to (1) 
license the SEP on RAND or royalty-free terms; (2) not to enforce the SEP against technology 
implementers; (3) declare that it is not aware that it holds any (potential) SEPs; or (4) refuse to 
provide any commitment about its licensing intentions (a “negative” LoA).31 The latter does 
not automatically lead to the exclusion of the technology at issue - or its owner - from the 
standards development: however, the absence of a LoA is taken into account during the process 
of standards approval.32 A patent-holder may even submit a “blanket” LoA that applies to all 
of its existing and future SEPs, rather than making a FRAND declaration for only specific 
essential claims: while such a declaration does not identify a specific patent and, arguably, 
lacks transparency, it ensures that a sometimes substantial amount of patents is subject to the 
                                                   
 
Commitments in a Repeated Game of Standard-Setting Organizations, 54 REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1, 159 (2019) (suggesting that structured licensing commitments such as price caps are 
inefficient in a repeated interaction setting). 
30 See the definition of LoA in IEEE SA Bylaws: “a document, including any attachments, stating the 
Submitter’s position regarding ownership, enforcement, or licensing of Essential Patent Claims for a 
specifically referenced IEEE Standard, submitted in a form acceptable to the IEEE-SA.” Article 6.1 of IEEE 
Standards Association’s (IEEE-SA) Standards Board Bylaws (March 2019), available at 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf (last accessed 24 March 2019). 
31 Article 6.2 of Standards Board Bylaws. 
32 See also Business Review Letter to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (30 April 2007), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-and-electronics-engineers-incs-
request-business-review-letter (last accessed 24 March 2019); Business Review Letter to the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2 February 2015), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.htm (last accessed 24 March 2019). 




FRAND commitment.33 Once filled out and signed by the patent-holder, the LoA form is 
submitted to the IEEE Patent Committee (PatCom) prior to the final approval of the standard 
at issue by the IEEE SA Standards Board. The signed LoAs are irrevocable and create binding 
obligations for their submitters to the date that the standard is withdrawn.34  
Since patent policies may impose constraints on the discretion of stakeholders to set royalty 
rates, they can also be regarded as an important indirect cost of an SDO membership. However, 
when a patent-holder refuses committing to such licensing requirements, an SDO has to 
consider developing standards using alternative technologies,35 which may result in suboptimal 
results. Consequently, patent policies exert normative pull on participants faced with 
technology selection and wield significant influence on the outcomes of negotiations relating 
to the promulgation of standards.  
 
III. MODIFICATIONS OF PATENT POLICIES 
The process of designing, revising and enforcing patent policies is intrinsically a matter of 
SDOs’ governance: regulators typically prefer to undertake a “procedural approach” requiring 
that SDOs’ legal frameworks do not contravene existing laws. Notwithstanding the method 
followed by an SDO in its governance processes, modifications of its rules and policies, 
including those on IP, are of crucial importance for the participants in standards development, 
since they can distort the understanding of costs to benefits analysis when seeking membership 
of the SDO.36  
For this reason, rules that significantly affect standards development such as patent policies 
should be considered as part and parcel of such development. They are as important and 
relevant for members as the voting procedures for technical aspects of any given standard 
developed. By the same token, procedural aspects surrounding the functioning of an SDO are 
of substantive nature.37 Accordingly, when the rules change, a situation may arise wherein the 
expectations based on the initial repertoire of rules are not being fulfilled, thus imposing 
                                                   
 
33 In this regard, see T. Pohlmann who suggests that “while blanket declarations can provide broader FRAND 
assurances, they also can limit the accuracy and usefulness of patent counting”, T. Pohlmann, Empirical 
Study on Patenting and Standardization Activity in IEEE, IPlytics GmbH (March 2017), available at 
https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/IPlytics_2017_Patenting-and-standardization-
activities-at-IEEE.pdf (last accessed 21 March 2019), at 5. 
34 Business Review Letter to IEEE (2007), supra note 32, at 7.  
35 E.g. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Annex 6 ETSI Rules of Procedure (3 April 2018), available 
at http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf (last accessed 24 June 2019), clause 8. 
36 In this regard, see also Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 
104 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE (2015) 48, at 56.  
37 Cf. Delimatsis, supra note 11, 101. Indeed, a smooth functioning of an SDO is ensured when the 
operational rules, collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules are viewed as a pool of interconnected 
levels of rules that cannot change without having significant effects on the other sets of rules – and thus on 
ensuring harmony within the organization. L. Kiser and E. Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A 
Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches, in STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL INQUIRY (E. Ostrom 
ed., 1982). 




constraints and obligations scarcely anticipated by the affected member(s).38 It would be 
erroneous to believe that all participants would become SDO members in the first place if they 
somehow knew in advance that they will have no real say in the modification of such policies. 
Therefore, the revision of SDOs’ operational rules must be undertaken in a balanced manner 
that seeks to reflect the interests of all stakeholders and interests.39 This is especially the case 
when the changes are retroactive and affect previous commitments made by members and in 
cases where the conflicts of interests are evident such as in the case of AMTSO (antivirus 
companies versus testing companies) or the IEEE (innovators versus implementers). 
A. Iterations of Revisions of Patent Policies  
Revisions of SDOs’ patent policies may be spurred by new market developments or as a 
response to critique by governmental authorities. In general, SDOs modify their intellectual 
property rules about once a year:40 while most of these changes are rather minor, some 
substantial modifications include amendments to the rules on transfer of intellectual property 
and clarifications to disclosure and licensing requirements.41 Most of these revisions were 
fueled by concerns of patent ambush and excessive royalty rates set by patent-holders,42 and 
aimed to ensure that patent-holders do not wield undue market power because of their 
ownership of essential technologies.43 
The history of modifications to SDOs’ patent policies is rich in some more remarkable 
examples. With a strong influence and political pressure from the European Commission (EC) 
in the development of 2G, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was 
one of the first EU-based SDOs to use as a basis for its patent policy the FRAND licensing 
requirement since 1994.44 The policy change was induced by a series of EC investigations on 
                                                   
 
38 By analogy, see E. Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS. THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990), explaining how the changes at each level of institutional rules may increase 
uncertainties among members of an institution.   
39 G. Willingmyre, ‘Giving Process its Due When a Standard Development Organization Changes the Rules 
of the Game’ (2017) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2903602 (last 
accessed 24 March 2019). The JRC report, however, refers to scholarship that stated that coalition of clubs 
may fail to adopt efficiency-enhancing rules because members may vote against rules that may improve 
organizational performance if these rules weaken their influence on future policy revision, or they anticipate 
that they are difficult to reverse; following this reasoning, not all interests should be taken on board when 
revising the policy. See The JRC Report, at 84. 
40 Tsai&Wright, supra note 28. 
41 See JRC report, referencing among others, Layne- Farrar, supra note 23; Tsai&Wright, supra note 28; J. 
Baron and D. Spulber, Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations: Introduction to the Searle 
Center Database, 27 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 3, at 478 (2018). 
42 Layne-Farrar, supra note 23. 
43 The JRC report, p. 139. 
44 See ETSI/GA20 (94) 20; ETSI/GA20 (94)22Rev. 1. In contrast, the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), the leading technology SDO of that time, merely had a vague Code of Conduct for intellectual 
property rights. See E.J. Iversen, Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: ETSI’s controversial 
search for new IPR procedures, in STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. 
PROC. 1ST INT. CONF. ON STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (K. Jakobs 
and R. Williams, eds., 1999). 




SEP holders,45 and was amended in 2004 to include an obligation to disclose essential claims 
and to commit to licensing on broad FRAND terms.46 This disclosure obligation was reinforced 
in the 2005 revision, in response to continuing antitrust concerns expressed by the 
Commission.47 However, the subsequent attempt to introduce yet another amendment in 2006, 
this time stipulating, among others, the requirement to disclose the licensing terms ex ante, was 
not well received by the EC,48 which led to the adoption of less stringent licensing requirements 
in 2007. 
Also the VMEbus International Trade Association, commonly known as VITA, an SDO 
developing standards for VMEbus technology and electronic interconnections and systems 
design,49 has experienced revisions of its IPR rules fueled by the late disclosure of essential 
patent claims and demanding royalty rates that were unexpectedly high according to the VITA 
community and created risk of hold-up and ambush.50 In 2006, VITA outlined a policy that 
required, alongside the disclosure of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), ex ante disclosure of 
the maximum royalty rates a technology vendor would demand for the licensing of its essential 
patent claims.51 VITA’s proposed rules implied that patent-holders that failed to comply with 
the disclosure requirement would be obliged to license their technologies on royalty-free 
basis.52 The policy was commended by the two authorities in the realm of US standardization: 
the US Department of Justice furnished a positive Business Review Letter (BRL) in which it 
concluded on an optimistic note that the new patent policy did not give rise to be challenged 
on anticompetitive grounds.53 Furthermore, ANSI re-accredited VITA as an American 
Standards Developer (ASD) that complies with the ANSI Essential Requirements (although 
this was vehemently objected to by Motorola).54  
                                                   
 
45 M. Dolmans, Standards for Standards, 26 FORDHAM INTL. LJ. 1, 163 (2002). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See the letter of 21 June 2006 from A. Tradacete Cocera, Director - Information, Communication and 
Media, European Commission Competition Directorate-General, to Karl Heinz Rosenbrock, ETSI Director 
General, in J. Contreras, supra note 27, note 61 and accompanied text.  
49 Setting of standards does not take place in VITA itself but in the Vita Standards Organization VSO. In 
this Article, we follow the approach of many academic studies and refer to the SDO by its informal 
definition. See Bekkers and Updegrove, supra note 24, at 8. 
50 Business Review Letter Request of 15 June 2006, from R.A. Skitol to Assistant Attorney General T.O. 
Barnett, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/06/16/302160.pdf (last 
accessed 24 March 2019) at 2 and 3.  
51Ibid, at 3 and 4.   
52 Ibid, at 2. 
53 More specifically, the DoJ found that “VITA’s Patent Policy is an attempt to preserve competition and 
thereby to avoid unreasonable patent licensing terms that might threaten the success of future 
standards…delay adoption and implementation after standards are set”. Business Review Letter to VMEbus 
International Trade Association of 30 October 2006, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-
vmebus-international-trade-association-vitas-request-business-review-letter (last accessed 24 March 2019). 
The Business Review Letter provides a non-binding statement that the DoJ does not intent to take any 
antitrust enforcement action. 
54 See J. Contreras, An Empirical Study on the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing, supra note 27, n 42 and 43 and 
accompanied text. ANSI accredits SDOs to a set of procedural requirements contained in the ANSI Essential 
Requirements: Due process requirements for American National Standards (‘Essential Requirements’). 




In the software industry, the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standard (OASIS), a global consortium mainly administering software standards, initially had 
a RAND-based Patent Policy (“Legacy IPR Policy”), which however did not receive a 
unanimous endorsement across different industry fields.55 A so-called “multi-track” patent 
policy adopted in 2005 was deemed to be more appropriate considering the broad scope of 
OASIS activities, since it allowed working groups to choose from three different sets of 
licensing requirements (“IPR modes”): reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (RAND); 
royalty free on RAND terms; and royalty-free on limited terms.56 The amendment introduced 
a formalized requirement to grant licenses for SEPs through any of the three IPR modes.57 
While commended for offering stakeholders a greater flexibility, the new policy generated 
consternation amongst the free software and open source developers over concerns of 
encouraging holders of large patent portfolios to enter private agreements among themselves.58 
The subsequent policy modification of 2009 introduced the Non-Assertion IPR Mode,59 the 
result being, OASIS patent policy now contains four optional ‘tracks’.60 OASIS patent policy 
was as well endorsed by ANSI for its compliance with ANSI Essential Requirements. 
In the realm of web standards, the first version of the World Wide Web Consortium’s 
(W3C) Patent Policy, drafted in 1999, encompassed the requirement to disclose essential 
patents and license them to all implementers on royalty-free or RAND terms. This requirement 
was vehemently opposed by open source software developers.61 A revised Policy, adopted in 
2003, required all members of its working groups to offer their technology on royalty-free 
basis, except when the essentiality is established by the Patent Advisory Group (PAG) 
(consisting of all working group members and the W3C chair), and when other technologies 
are not available.62 Despite being still the W3C policy, there were stakeholders who argued 
that the policy change would produce significant adverse effects on innovation. 
                                                   
 
55 See, among others, T. Stoll, ‘Are you still in? The Impact of Licensing Requirements on the Composition 
of Standards Setting Organizations’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper 
No. 14 18, 2014, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535735 (last accessed 
24 March 2019). 
56 OASIS, IPR (20 January 2005), available at https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-guidelines/ipr-2005-01-
20 (last accessed 24 March 2019). 
57 Ibid. 
58 See i.e. an email from Lawrence Rosen, entitled ‘A call to action on OASIS Patent Policy’ (22 February 
2005) available at https://lwn.net/Articles/124548/ (last accessed 24 March 2019). Anecdotally, the 
opposition was driven by W3C members who also happened to be members of OASIS and did not favor 
open software licensing.  
59 ‘OASIS Introduces Non-Assertion Mode to Its Intellectual Property Rights Policy for Standards 
Development’ (15 June 2009), available at https://www.oasis-open.org/news/pr/oasis-introduces-non-
assertion-mode-to-its-intellectual-property-rights-policy-for-standards (last accessed 24 March 2019). 
60 Current policy was approved in July 2013 and is available at https://www.oasis-open.org/policies-
guidelines/ipr (last accessed 24 March 2019). 
61 According to Contreras, the 2,500 comments on patent policy, most of which were negative, have been 
reviewed by the W3C. J. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization and the Internet, 
DENVER LAW REVIEW 853, at 877 (2016).  
62 W3C Patent Policy (5 February 2004, updated 1 August 2017) available at 
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20170801/ (last accessed 24 March 2019). 




Thus far, the review of literature suggests that the responses ensuing from the revisions of 
patent policies have been examined in detail in only a few studies. In the case of OASIS, Stoll 
empirically analyzed whether the shift from a RAND to royalty-free licensing requirements 
had a significant impact on the SDO’s membership and composition,63 with his findings 
suggesting that the introduction of the ‘multi-mode’ policy in 2005 is correlated with a 
significant decrease in the rate of addition of new members. Stoll studied the profiles of new 
members after the revision of the policy and noted that the share of not-for-profit stakeholders 
and system integrators (whose main source of income was unrelated to licensing revenues) 
significantly increased, whereas the share of software producers decreased.64 He found that in 
contrast to the situation under the RAND-policy, producers of physical goods retained their 
OASIS membership status for a longer time. This study also demonstrated that OASIS’ new 
policy did not face much opposition from stakeholders: in 2014, the vast majority of technical 
committees operated either in royalty-free or non-assertion modes. While only two committees 
maintained the initial RAND licensing requirements, the majority of newly established 
technical committees operated on the Non-Assertion mode.65 
In the case of VITA, Contreras analyzed the effects of VITA’s patent policy revisions on 
its membership levels and pace of standardization activities.66 Contrary to predictions, 
Contreras observed a net increase in VITA membership in the three years following the 
adoption of the new policy (albeit adopted with two negative votes - with one of the negative 
voters, Motorola, having publicly opposed the new IPR rules and subsequently withdrawing 
from VITA). Moreover, the majority of VITA members perceived the revised policy to have 
had a positive impact on VITA’s standardization activity: 67 in this regard, Contreras’ study 
shows that the licensing terms and the behavior of patent holders has a significant influence on 
the members’ willingness to participate in VITA’s standards development. Contrary to VITA, 
W3C experienced decrease in its membership after the adoption of its new patent policy. This 
does not only demonstrate that the revisions of patent policies may affect the membership and 
composition of SDO, but also that the effects would depend on SDOs institutional context and 
setup. 
 
B. IEEE Patent Policy Update 
1. Substance of revisions 
                                                   
 
63 Stoll, supra note 55.  
64 According to Stoll, “one explanation for the lower share of software producers in new SDO members can 
be the aforementioned disappointment of the open source and free software community,” Stoll, supra note 
55, at 28. 
65 Ibid.  
66 J. Contreras, An Empirical Study on the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing, supra note 27. 
67 As a part of this study, VITA’s members were asked to fill in the survey that included questions regarding 
their experience in VITA prior and after the policy modification. Variables measured included speed of 
standards-development at VITA, length of time spent by the respondent on VITA standards-development 
and quality of VITA standards. Additional questions asked for information regarding the respondent's 
actions taken in response to ex ante licensing disclosures, and to the adoption of the VITA ex ante policy. 




The very first version of the IEEE Patent Policy dates back to the 1990 and was merely 
based on FRAND commitment and ex ante disclosure of essential claims. This policy, 
however, suffered from deficiencies: the FRAND obligations were ambiguous and no 
mechanism existed to allow for a discussion of licensing terms or the undertaking of a 
comparative assessment of the costs of proposed technologies.68 The concerns posed by such 
drawbacks drove the IEEE-SA members to undertake significant revisions to the Policy in 
2006.69 Similar to the  ETSI, the revised patent policy allowed (but did not require) patent-
holders to disclose their maximum licensing terms ex ante and, to a certain extent, enabled 
participants of standards development to discuss licensing costs prior to standards adoption.70 
Alongside these novelties, the policy also clarified that the commitments stemming from LoAs 
were irrevocable and binding upon the Submitter and its affiliates.71 The DoJ commended the 
proposed modifications, having observed that it would indeed facilitate working groups’ 
members in taking “better informed decisions” and “could lead to faster development, 
implementation and adoption of a standard as well as fewer litigated disputes after a standard 
is set”.72 Upon obtaining a favorable Business Review Letter, the IEEE SA Standards Board 
adopted the new policy in May 2007.  
Despite the acclaim of the DoJ Antitrust Division, the 2007 Update did not offer a panacea 
for the alleged challenges of the IEEE SA Patent Policy. The opportunity to disclose maximum 
royalty rates was not eagerly seized by patent holders,73  and the lack of clarity on the definition 
of “reasonable rates” and “non-discriminatory” in FRAND appeared to hinder standards 
development.74 Meanwhile, discussions concerning SDOs’ patent policies drew the attention 
of governmental agencies and academics,75 possibly triggered by the “new wave” of litigation 
on SEPs.76 In the wake of these events, the IEEE SA introduced a second revision of its IPR 
rules.  
This time, amendments of the patent policy were more extensive and preliminarily sought 
to mitigate the concerns for alleged patent hold-up and royalty stacking. In its request to the 
                                                   
 
68 Ibid, at 8. 
69 M.A. Lindsay, Business Review Letter Request to Assistant Attorney General, T.O. Barnett (29 November 
2006), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/01/28/302148.pdf (last 
accessed 24 March 2019), at 3 and 5.  
70 Business Review Letter to IEEE (2007), supra note 32. 
71 Business Review Letter Request (2006), at 4.  
72 Business Review Letter to IEEE (2007), supra note 32, at 10. 
73 The IEEE-SA only received two LoAs out of 40 in which patent holders accepted to disclose maximum 
rates: M.A. Lindsay, Business Review Letter Request to Assistant Attorney General, W.J. Baer (30 
September 2014), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/17/311483.pdf 
(last accessed 24 March 2019), at 10. 
74 Ibid. That lead to diverse interpretation of the 2007 policy, see K. Karachalios, ‘Fundamental Uncertainty 
at the Intersection between Patents and Standards’ (November/December 2015) The Patent Lawyer, 33.  
75  See, especially, R. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six ‘Small’ 
Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable 13 (10 October 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf (last accessed 24 June 2019).  
76 E.g. cases as Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217; Apple, Inc. v. Motorola 
Mobility, Inc. No. 11–cv–178–bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 157525, Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 
6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, and many others. 




DoJ to provide a BRL, the IEEE SA submitted four changes77 it intended to implement in the 
new patent policy. The first two proposed modifications (that is, first, the prohibition for 
Submitters of LoAs78 that have been determined complete and posted on the IEEE SA web site 
(“Accepted LoAs”) to seek, or seek to enforce, injunctions (or, “Prohibitative Order”) against 
implementers unless those fail to participate in, or to comply with the outcome of an 
adjudication by the appropriate authorities;79 and, second, the permission for patent holders to 
require reciprocity in licensing only with regard to the patents that are essential to a single 
standard, and only when the reciprocity relates to a SEP) introduce explicit changes to the 
policy. The remaining two points rather took the form of clarifications: first, the option to 
determine the “reasonable rate” based on the value of the relevant functionality of the smallest 
saleable patent practicing unit (SSPPU)80 compliant implementations of the SEP; and, second, 
that IPRs shall be licensed for “any Compliant Implementation”, meaning any product or 
service that conforms to any mandatory or optional portion of a normative clause of an IEEE 
Standard.81 The latter point in particular would mean that licenses could be granted for inputs 
of a particular product (such as chips, screens or transistors) instead for the entire, final product 
(such as a mobile phone or a car).82  
The significant departure of the revised policy from common practice did not go unnoticed 
by a number of scholars and other SDOs:83 for instance, it has been questioned whether the 
substance of the new IEEE Patent Policy and the process of its adoption could potentially 
                                                   
 
77 Those are sometimes termed by IEEE as “specifications,” highlighting that no major changes were made 
and suggesting that the more specific obligations of the version after 2015 apply retroactively, that is, also 
to commitments made before 2015; some, however, talk about revisions to highlight the departure of the 
new policy from previous practice. 
78 Note that according to the language of IEEE Patent Policy, “Submitter” is an individual or an organization 
providing an LoA, who may not necessarily be the SEP holder.  
79 The reason that policy provides is that there is sufficient compensation for Accepted LOAs. 
80 On SSPPU, see David Kappos and (The Honorable) Paul R. Michel, The Smallest Salable Patent-
Practicing Unit: Observations On Its Origins, Development, And Future, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 
(2018). This method was deemed a good starting point for FRAND determinations in an evidentiary rule 
developed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
81 Business Review Letter Request (2014), supra note 73, at 15 – 17; also IEEE SASB Bylaws clause 6.   
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launched by Continental Automotive Systems against Avanci, a dispute that demonstrates how questions of 
licensing, SEPs and SDO patent policy permeate most, if not all, industrial sectors. At the heart of the claim 
is the allegation by Continental, a supplier of cellurar components to car manufacturers, that Avanci, a patent 
poll licensing cellular SEPs, breached FRAND commitments for the SPEs that it offered to license. In 
essence, according to Continental, Avanci only licensing patents directly to car manufacturers, thereby 
hitting two birds with one stone: first, inflating its royaltie rate by taking the final vehicle as the basis for 
such calculation and, second, excludes competition, by refusing to license patents to intermediaries like 
Continental Automotive Systems that are active in the components market. See Continental Automotive 
Systems, Inc. v Avanci, LLC et al, Case No. 5:2019cv02520, May 10, 2019. 
83 IEEE became the first SDO regulating FRAND royalties, and quite exceptional in referring to commercial 
– and not only technological – essentiality. Most importantly, a reasonable rate is a commonly specified 
percentage of the price of a downstream product, rather than of a compliant implementation. See Sidak, 
supra note 36, at 59. Remarkably, similar changes to patent policy were not accepted in ETSI or ITU due to 
the lack of consensus among SDO members. Recently, IEEE withdrew its request for partnership at 1M2M 
project co-hosted by ETSI, allegedly due to the incompatibility of IEEE Patent Policy with the one of ETSI. 
Interviews with industry representatives, January 15, 2018; January 16, 2018 and January 17, 2018; on file 
with the authors. 




breach EU competition law.84 The suggested alleviation that patent-holders may avoid the 
amendments by declining to submit an LoA appeared to lack practical considerations, and so 
did the allegation that licensors remain free to enforce their IPR claims once the violation has 
been established by a Court and the licensees have failed to accord with the outcomes of the 
litigation.85 Nonetheless, the proposed revisions were not opposed by the DoJ, which observed 
that the new policy “brought clarity to the FRAND commitment and hence has a potential to 
facilitate and improve standards development process”.86 
 
2. Analyses of Effects of the Updated Policy  
Modifications to IEEE Patent Policy generated debate on its effects on the work of the 
IEEE and on the industry in general. Upon the adoption of the new rules to the SDO’s 
operational framework, various attempts have been made to sketch the (admittedly, short-term) 
impact of the policy amendments on standardization activity within the IEEE based on the 
number of submitted LoAs. One of the first reactions was offered by Katznelson, who observed 
the increased amount of missing LoAs (meaning, LoAs that were not provided by patent-
holders despite the request by the IEEE-SA), alongside the overall decrease of submitted LoAs 
after the policy took effect in March 2015.87 Katznelson also suggested that the ever-increasing 
number of negative declarations creates uncertainty about the adoption of a standard, as well 
as incorporation of IEEE standards by other SDOs, thereby having a chilling effect on 
technological innovation. 
Katznelson’s arguments were rebutted by a response from Ohana, who submitted that the 
policy change in IEEE was driven by concerns in its standardization processes and pointed out 
the liberty of SDOs to experiment with diverse licensing models.88 Such diversification, 
according to Ohana, is beneficial to a broad range of stakeholders, including standard-setters 
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and consumers. Another critique of Katznelson’s analysis referred to its lack of consideration 
of submitted “blanket” LoAs, as mentioned in the empirical study of IPlytics.89  
While the data assessed by IPlytics demonstrates that the major increase in the number of 
submitted LoAs in 2015 was indeed followed by a dramatic reduction in 2016, IPlytics asserts 
that “patent counting” may not be the right approach to evaluate IEEE’s robustness since it 
fails to embrace the common practice of submitting blanket declarations, which in turn also 
cover their IPRs in the successive versions of a standard. Instead, IPlytics uses alternative 
methods, such as the number of approved standards, citations of IEEE technical specifications 
and the amount of Project Authorization Requests (PARs), to assess the consequences of the 
2015 policy amendment for IEEE standardization activities. The findings of this study indicate 
the increase of approved standards and PARs in 2015 and 2016 in comparison to the preceding 
years, and concludes that while the number of LoAs received after the new policy took effect 
is generally in line with historical fluctuations, standardization activities within IEEE-SA 
continue to flourish.90 The drawback, however, of this otherwise thorough analysis is that it 
does not differentiate between the negative LoAs, declarations containing restatements of 
patent-holders’ commitments given prior to the implementation of the revised policy, and 
“new” LoAs. 
Using the same datasets as Katznelson and IPlytics, Mallinson examined the number of 
LoAs submitted to the IEEE after the new policy took effect.91 Mallinson revealed that nearly 
three quarters of LoAs submitted to 802.11 Working Group, and almost a half of all LoAs 
submitted to the IEEE in 2016-2017 were negative, whereas more than one third of major 
contributors to IEEE standardization were unwilling to license their technologies under the 
new terms. Mallinson concludes on a less optimistic note than IPlytics and warns that the 
absence of positive LoAs creates greater uncertainty for implementers and may even cripple 
the future implementation of a standard.  
The most recent analysis was provided by Gupta and Effraimidis in 2018, who studied the 
effect of the modified patent policy 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee (LMSC), as its 
Working Groups account for the major share of patented technologies incorporated into 
standards.92 Similarly to the previous studies, they analyzed the number of LoAs and PARs 
submitted before and after the new policy was introduced; they also explored whether and to 
what extent did the policy revision affect the duration of standardization activities within the 
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IEEE. Their findings on LoAs are in line with those of Mallinson and Katznelson and reveal 
that a large share of LoAs provided by patent holders after the revised policy took effect are 
either “repeat” or “negative”. Next to a slight decline in PARs submission to 802 LMSC, they 
further observe that the comment resolution process in 802.11 WLAN working group takes, on 
average, more than three-quarter longer than under the previous policy, and hence negatively 
affects standards’ approval speed. Interestingly, this conclusion is starkly in contrast with 
Contreras’ findings on the consequences of the 2007 policy update as regards the duration of 
standardization process.93 Yet, Contreras also suggested that the increase of standardization 
activities in both VITA and IEEE shortly after the policy revision was not correlated to the 
amended licensing requirements and could be explained by other factors: following his 
analysis, the same applies to membership fluctuations of both organizations.94  
Based on these studies, we submit that neither contrasting the 2007 and 2015 revisions of 
IEEE Patent Policy nor comparing policy modifications within OASIS, VITA and IEEE would 
result in a sufficiently robust analysis. This is due to the fundamental difference in their 
institutional architecture and operational fields. Nevertheless, despite providing mixed 
evidence on the actual impact of new patent policies, all mentioned studies prove to be 
tremendously useful for analyzing members’ reactions on modifications of patent rules. 
 
IV. EXIT, VOICE & LOYALTY AS A RESULT OF POLICY CHANGE IN AN SDO 
A. Introduction to Hirschman’s Framework 
In his treatise ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ (1970), Hirschman suggests that when consumers 
face a decline in the quality of a product or service, they may respond by "voicing" their 
dissatisfaction to the firm providing those goods or services in the hopes of an improvement, 
or else opt for exiting or switching to a different provider. Hirschman notes that such a choice 
is applicable even for non-economic organizations such as trade unions where services are 
provided to members without ‘direct monetary counterpart’.  
When consumers or members opt for “voice”, firms are alerted to the deficiency and are 
able to respond to make amends and incorporate learnings. However, if a 'critical mass' of 
consumers swiftly opt for exit (switching), it may imperil the survival of the firm, or in the case 
of a membership-driven organization, lower its membership to unsustainable levels. 
Hirschman recognizes that although markets are seldom perfectly competitive, the function of 
"loyalty" among the consumers/ members provides a 'regenerative' effect by inducing inertia/ 
delay on the decision to “exit”. The provider is afforded the time and latitude to perceive 
discontentment and undertake the appropriate course correction.  
 
1. Definition of Voice, Exit and Loyalty 
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Hirschman defines voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an 
objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the 
management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including 
those that are meant to mobilize public opinion”. Furthermore, he notes that, voice emerges as 
the "only means" of expressing discontent when there is monopolistic supply (thus no 
switching option) or if the deterioration in quality occurs simultaneously across all competing 
service/ goods providers, thus rendering switching futile. Thus, market structure plays a key 
role in the expression of voice as opposed to exit. 
In contrast to voice, Hirschman suggests “exit” to be an act of withdrawing from the 
organization. With regard to the specific example of a consumer availing a product or a service, 
an exit without making a fuss carries the allure of being less “messy” or in the words of 
Hirschman ‘a private, "secret" vote in the anonymity of a supermarket’ (see page 16, 
Hirschman 1970). Hirschman also notes the preference for ‘neatness of exit over the messiness 
and heartbreak of voice’.95 Voice is a costly alternative since it requires effort and time and 
risks additional delays and free riding.96  
Exit may thus emerge to be the dominant strategy for members.  Even more so, when the 
desired outcomes are more likely at other fora. The latter, however, presupposes low switching 
costs, or else reliable alternatives. Hirschman observes that when exit is a 'wide-open option' 
co-existent with 'voice', two crucial determinants sway the decision making of members 
towards that of opting for 'voice': (a) member's willingness to 'trade-off certainty of exit against 
the uncertainties of an improvement', which Hirschman relates to 'loyalty'; and (b) 'an estimate 
on the ability to influence'. 'Loyalty', therefore emerges as the factor that compels members to 
stick around or delay their exit (despite availability of a 'competing or substitute' organization). 
Hirschman opines that such members moved by "loyalty" are driven by the need to 'do 
something' by exerting their influence (which necessitates staying on as a member). The 
alternate motivators being: waiting on their faithfulness whilst hoping that the complaints of 
others may bring about change (italicized by Hirschman), and the inertia to exit given the 
possibility of reversal of the situation. Given that loyalty emerges as the 'key concept' that 
impairs the member firm's tendency to exit (and/or slow down the pace of movement towards 
exit), it is no surprise that Hirschman terms exit as a form of 'disloyalty'.  
Notably, Hirschman cautions that loyal behavior, while intrinsically psychological, retains 
an 'enormous dose of reasoned calculation' and increases a member’s propensity to choose 
voice over exit.97 Indeed, Hirschman asserts that the likelihood of voice is commensurate to 
the degree of loyalty, and that a member with a sense of attachment to the organization would 
actively seek ways to improve its levels of influence while suffering in silence. Crucially, 
Hirschman appears to suggest that there are multiple avenues of exercising influence. By 
choosing to voice their concerns, members can (attempt to) resist policy change from within 
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rather than challenge it from outside (arguably, even in case of low switching costs). An 
important, additional concept that is of help to understand such a construct is agency and the 
way it can affect the mechanics and dynamics in an evolving organization.98 
Even the most loyal member retains the freedom to exit, a fact that can, depending on the 
context, enhance the bargaining power of that member within the deteriorating organization. 
Notwithstanding that insignificant members could indulge in ‘cheap talk’, a potential exit of a 
truly loyal member will not be costless for the member, since the organization itself may also 
make exit quite costly (both for the loyal and the disloyal members) by imposing high penalties 
for exit but also high fees or other barriers for (re-)entry. 
 
 
2. Previous Applications of Hirschman's Framework 
Hirschman’s framework has been applied to study responses in “collaborative settings” 
driven organizations where 'repairable lapse(s)' of judgement cause discontent amongst 
members. Examples include trade unions, voluntary organizations, or political parties.  
A scoping literature review indicates that Hirschman’s treatise has been applied across 
diverse settings – political science, sociology, social psychology, labor economics, and 
management.99 The diverse range of applications covers relationships between automobile 
manufacturers and suppliers in times of industry downturn;100 modes of expression of dissent 
under an oppressive regime; 101 and industry self-regulation and inter-organizational relations 
in the domain of private security company (PSC).102 Notably, the study by Dowding et al. notes 
that the application of this framework argument has been “somewhat disappointing” in 
consideration of the “perceptiveness” of Hirschman’s original, and insightful observations. 
However, O’Donnell’s refinement in categorizing voice into “horizontal” and “vertical” voice 
is noteworthy. "Horizontal voice" refers to communication of dissatisfaction between actors 
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that share some form of collective identity (such as fellow citizens, friends, neighbors), and 
"vertical voice" refers to communication of dissatisfaction between actors at differing levels of 
hierarchy (consumers to firms, employees to employers). Hirschman in his later work (1986) 
notes the costliness of vertical voice, and the ‘expressive benefits’ associated with the usage of 
horizontal voice. 
Given the wide, and albeit potentially inconsistent application of Hirschman’s framework, 
the manifestations of responses of an SDO's member firms might not always comparably 
coincide with that of the examples by Hirschman and existent literature. To illustrate the variety 
of definitions adopted in the scholarship,103 the table below attempts to capture the broader 
labels of exit and voice. 
 
 
 Exit Voice 
Descriptions Terminating the relationship, withdrawing (SH) 
remedy or redress through 




Impersonal (H), Anonymous (H) Messy (H) 
Avoidance of confrontation (H) Requires articulation (H) 
Indirect (H) Direct and straightforward (H) 
Fairly crude (D) Badly underdeveloped mechanism (H) 
Belongs to the realm of economics,  
market forces (H) 
Belongs to the realm of politics, non-
market forces (H) 
Blunt, avoids saying what is wrong 
(EK) 
Provides precise information (EK) 
Strategic 
considerations 
Strategic - but less manipulable (D) 'cheap' talk for strategic purposes (D) 
Does not exclude the opportunity to 
use exit (H) 
Excludes the opportunity to use voice 
(H)  
Effect is negated if the organization 
acquires new as it loses the old (H) 
Assumes influence and bargaining 
power (H) 
Costs Less costly to Voice, except when loyalty is present (H) 
Costlier (H) 
Intensity Dominant reaction to deterioration (H) - powerful (H) 
Subtle (D) 
Variability 
Clear-cut either-or decision-making 
(H), Binary response (D), 
dichotomous (D) 
Continuous variable (D) - has a scale of 
graduation (from faint grumbling to 
violent protest) (H) 
Other attributes Can atrophy the development of the art of voice (H) 
Is an art constantly evolving in new 
directions (H) 
Can be a residual of exit (H), can be a 
substitute and a complement to exit (H) 
Legend H: Hirschman; D: O’Donnell 104; EK: Krahmann 105; SH: Susan Helper106 
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B. Hirschman’s framework in the context of standard setting 
 
This Article argues that Hirschman’s framework squarely fits to situations when SDO 
decisions and policies pertaining to governance and impact on working procedures are 
negatively perceived as “repairable lapses” by members, and subsequently affect the 
standardization process, albeit with some caveats. Given that SDOs claim to be “producers” 
and “enablers” of standards, the SDOs may be treated as service providers in the context of 
consensus based formal technical standard setting. Extant literature notes that when potential 
member firms deliberate on SDO membership, they take into account the amenability, viability 
and certainty associated with the decision-making processes of the SDO with their identified 
needs. The member firms not only bear the direct costs of membership fees, but also the 
indirect, intangible costs of time and ensuing effort put in by their personnel towards 
representation and participation in such arenas. 
Hirschman’s framework appears to suggest that declines in the performance of 
organizations could be corrected with the right balance of information, incentives and 
flexibility of response. However, SDOs operate under a specific set of constraints and 
challenges – a few demanding agility from the SDO on matters of governance and decision-
making, and a few imposing significant impairment on flexibility. The JRC report107 
categorizes these constraints as legal constraints pertaining to requirements of international 
trade law, competition law, intellectual property law, public procurement law; constraints 
resulting from diverse relationships with other SDOs; and constraints due to competitive 
responses to SDO decision-making.108  
SDOs are thus avowedly “loyal” to the pursuit of their vision and mission, which might 
emphasize contributing to the technological progress, strengthening efforts towards 
standardization, and maintaining their strategic roles in the realm of technical standard setting. 
Therefore, SDOs might be compelled to lobby for certain amendments to working procedures 
in order to be better equipped in dealing with constraints, or to prevail over worthy contenders 
and strategies, or to meet conflicting requirements by opting for compromises. In the eyes of 
the SDO policy makers, it is a change that constitutes “growing pains”, and is as such a 
necessary bitter pill. However, if the communication of the reasoning of such tectonic shifts in 
policy matter(s) is inadequate, such changes run a risk of being perceived as “repairable 
lapse(s)” by constituent members. 
Thus, SDOs run the risk of having well-intentioned policy changes implemented 
mechanisms riddled with “repairable lapses” and thus upsetting the delicate balance between 
the costs and benefits for certain member firms. Each member firm reserves a unique 
perception and quantification on costs of membership and on the certainty associated with 
norms (for example, on terms of inclusion of intellectual property) into standards developed at 
the arena, such reforms could easily cause discontent. 
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For example, Ray Alderman (affiliated with VITA) observes that firms operating in the 
ICT industry typically improve on profits and product differentiation by adding value in 
manufacturing; intellectual property and/or service.109 Alderman notes that manufacturing, and 
service aspects are susceptible to the vagaries of the market (uncertainty related to market 
share, and margins). In his view, IP value addition emerges as a favoured means of augmenting 
profits. However, the ensuing technological development and attempts towards incorporating 
it in standard(s) could disrupt or be incompatible with the “value-network principles” of the 
implementing firms. Alderman points out that circumstances could arise where the firm which 
has generated IP would prefer to pursue standard-setting at a venue, depending on the maturity 
of the technology, preferences on pace of standardization, and at times owing to preference for 
control and flexibility for avenues of monetization of the IP. Thus, if the patent policy of the 
SDO were to be amended, and were to incorporate additional binding elements (i.e. its rigidity), 
the more severely constrained are the set of choices that firms could exercise on monetising 
their IP and its timing.110  Perhaps, such constraints would force firms that score high on IP – 
also described as “technology sponsors” – to avoid considering membership of said SDOs, thus 
affecting the credibility of an SDO due to an endorsement deficit.111 Herein, we see that the 
amendment of procedures has a tangible impact on strategic considerations of the stakeholders.  
Based on the prior example, given the importance of IPR policy for SDOs’ functioning, a 
significant revision to IPR rules represents a moment for a member firm to take a pause, re-
assess the impact of the intended changes vis-à-vis its business model, existent product or 
service offerings, strategy for the future, and the ability to adequately internalize the costs of 
the efforts on standardization. If a credible few influential members discern that the intended 
changes upsets the equilibrium, it then transforms into a turning point within an SDO, acting 
as a divisive force within the organization, thereby creating two main camps of contrasting 
views. Be it as it may, the ‘exit’ of a significantly influential member under such conditions 
imposes a considerable “cost” on the SDO in terms of lowering its credibility, attractiveness or 
reputation for current members and potential new ones.  
A key tenet of Hirschman was that organizations are bound to suffer decay in their 
performance, regardless of their best efforts at preventing the decline. In such circumstances, 
and in conjunction with the existence of an imperfectly competitive market, Hirschman’s 
primary concern was that consumers opting for the exit option would simply delay the eventual 
demise of the firm. However, a far worse scenario, of consumers endlessly moving across 
equally poorly performing rivals and conveying an imprecise signal to the whole market to 
keep functioning sub-optimally, troubled Hirschman. From this perspective, if the SDOs were 
to invest time and effort to facilitate the dissatisfied members towards voicing their misgivings, 
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this could trigger loyalty and overall constitute a welcome development leading to an overall 
improvement in the standardization ecosystem.  
So far, the literature pertaining to standard setting has focussed on the activities undertaken 
towards a specific standard. In our study, we examine the nature of options specific to the 
member’s perception of retaining membership of the organization in light of “repairable 
lapses”. Of course, it would be a lot easier to make the process of exit simpler; however, 
administrative procedures are seldom simplistic. For example, ETSI recommends that 
members who wish to stop their membership should intimate their decision at least by 
September of the given year, to give enough time for the preference to be enforced by the start 
of the next year.112  
As much as Hirschman’s framework pertains “missteps” by organizations, we dwell on 
certain types of “repairable lapses” that Hirschman tackles by referring to the reasoning of 
economists – that firms fall behind “for a good reason”.113 In this study, we are mindful of 
Hirschman’s implicit assumption that the organization has undertaken a wrong move, and that 
at this critical juncture, an indication from the members would allow it to recognize its failings, 
and compel it to get back on track. Furthermore, we also study responses under “repairable 
lapses” that could be driven by deficiencies in the mechanism to capture voice or to convey 
strategic intents i.e. deficiencies in governance-related working practices. Furthermore, 
Dowding et al. (2000) note that the 'empirical foundations' of loyalty need to be 'analytically 
distinguished' to allow for the design of testable empirical hypotheses. Through this 
contribution, we intend to shed light on responses of member firms from the perspective of 
Hirschman's framework and their manifestations. 
For our purposes, “exit” consists of firm(s) ceasing membership and thereby desisting from 
participation in the SDO's standardization activities. A relevant example would be when certain 
members threatened to quit ETSI owing to the 1993 reforms to the IPR Policy,114 Motorola’s 
exit from VITA, and EFF’s exit from W3C. 
Additionally, “voice” comprises strategies adopted by SDO members to express their 
discontent, and influence the outcome of standardization processes under new rules to make 
the SDO re-consider the changes or intervene in the course of events. An example is how 
Russell describes the response to W3C’s proposal on a revised patent policy in 2001 - “angry 
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protest”, and “potentially fatal consequences of a rank-and-file mutiny”.115 Indeed, Russell 
relies on describing a threat by a participant as “threat to bypass, surpass, and ignore”, and 
refers to Hirschman’s framework to illustrate that W3C faced a “strategic turning point” at this 
juncture – to maintain its leading position, or to throw it away.116 We further distinguish 
between 'horizontal voice', wherein affected members coalesce to initiate an action with an 
intent to influence their peers’ behavior, and 'vertical voice', typically vocalized through 
appeals to governance authorities or complains to hierarchically superior bodies. 
Crucially, this Article assumes that due to repeated interactions in SDOs, practical 
difficulties to relocate initiated standardization processes to other organizations, as well as the 
uncertainties regarding whether and when disclosed patents will become essential, members’ 
“exit” remains very limited; rather, members prefer to employ different “voice” strategies to 
influence SDOs’ decisions while they continue to take part in SDOs’ work. Indeed, Hirschman 
notes that in cases where members are faced with a supplier of services with a monopoly, the 
member is seemingly “locked in”, and thus more inclined to exercise voice.117 This is all the 
more the case if exit comes with relatively high transaction costs and the SDO at issue provides 
sufficient flexibility to allow for reducing the costs of compliance with any internal policy 
changes, as we explain below. In this context, the Article also questions if loyalty is indeed the 
main factor precluding voice or exit in standardization, suggesting that voice can also be 
prevented by other constraints exogenous to the relations among SDOs’ membership. 
 
V. STRATEGIES OF VOICE WITHIN SDOs 
This section attempts to apply Hirschman’s framework to the IEEE 802.11 Working Group 
issuing specifications for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN). The experience of this 
group with the “voice” of discontented stakeholders constitutes an exciting case study where 
the application of the Hirschman framework comes to bear in full swing. This is because this 
group develops standards and specifications that account for most IPR declarations118 and the 
SDOs’ members of this group are most likely to disagree on patent policies due to their 
conflicting interests and vantage points.  
Based on the review of previous case studies and supplemented by interviews with industry 
professionals, this Article introduces a taxonomy of strategies that could be classified as 
“voice” under different circumstances in 802.11, namely a) developing a standard (or part 
thereof) in a different forum and bringing it back to the SDO; b) refusing to follow new rules; 
c) delaying the standardization process; d) filling an internal appeal to SDOs’ governing 
bodies; e) filling an external appeal to hierarchical bodies or to the competent Courts. It further 
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observes that while the first strategy is mostly employed, it is also subjected the most to 
antitrust concerns.  
It should be noted from the outset that this Article does not include the option of firms to 
voice their disagreement with SDOs’ patent policy revisions by either increasing or decreasing 
their participation in standards development meetings. In theory, such strategy can be exercised 
by companies, for instance, by acquiring or giving up leadership positions in Working Groups 
(i.e. chairs, editors) or by increasing or decreasing the number of attendees at the meetings. At 
first glance, examining fluctuations in the meeting’s attendance numbers of the 802.11 
Working Groups seems plausible due to the public availability of the relevant IEEE data. Yet, 
we believe that such prong for analyzing members’ “voice” strategies will be inaccurate for the 
following reasons.  
Firstly, while in some SDOs members represent the views of the entity with which they are 
affiliated (i.e. ISO, ETSI, W3C), SDOs and Working Groups with individual-based 
membership, such as 802.11, require that experts participate in standards development 
processes in their individual capacity.119 To what extent this requirement is indeed complied 
with in practice may significantly vary per company,120 and is difficult, if not impossible, to 
verify. Secondly, it is common for companies involved in standardization to employ experts 
that have been affiliated with other companies. This “hire away” practice may be motivated by 
companies’ strategies to enter the new markets, as well as by the ambitions of individual 
experts to advance their career. Thirdly, participants may have personal reasons not to attend 
standardization meetings, other than the “protest” strategy of the company of their affiliation. 
Hence, fluctuations in meeting attendance are likely to be explained by other factors than 
companies’ reaction on modifications of IPR rules, and measuring attendance will most likely 
not suffice for the purpose of our analysis.121 
 
A. Circumventing SDO’s standards development process through consortia   
1. Standardization and forum-shifting 
Strategies and motivators to join standardization platforms tend to vary according to firms’ 
incentives, size and competitive position, but also their anticipation of industry advancement 
and market forces. For instance, SDOs with low institutional costs may not be optimal for the 
establishment of global standards but provide attractive setting for less internationally 
competitive firms to develop regional standards.122 Actors aspiring to secure the acceptance of 
their standards with a formal endorsement are likely to carry out their projects in recognized 
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organizations,123 such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), ITU and 
IEEE,124 whereas those aiming to rapidly promote their technologies typically favor less 
systematized consortia or standardization groups, e.g. Bluetooth SIG and USB Implementers 
Forum. Such “informal” standardization is preferable across the range of ICT and 
telecommunication technology,125 although a large number of this type of standards, including 
Wi-Fi and GSM specifications, are developed and maintained by formal or even semi-
governmental standards bodies.  
Even when not actually developing a standard, consortia may provide services to facilitate 
its implementation. The Wi-Fi Alliance, an independent membership consortium, 
complements IEEE SA’ standardization activities by developing certification tests to establish 
compliance of electronic devices with IEEE 802.11 series.126 Curiously, the Wireless Gigabit 
Alliance (WiGig), which became part of the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2013,127 was initially established 
as a reaction on IEEE SA’s patent policy that did not allow standards development on a royalty-
free basis. Specifications developed by WiGig were subsequently brought back to the IEEE.  
Seeking endorsement of SDOs that enjoy global reputation has clear motives. While 
producing standards that inhere to the web of international and European regulation,128 these 
bodies are sited at the center of most standardization activities and issue standards that, beyond 
controversy, penetrate national legal orders and create normative expectations, while 
preserving their voluntary status.129 Formal approval by a recognized SDO thus enlarges 
standard’s scope of application and, when a standard has already earned the trust of the market, 
grants a certain degree of legitimacy to an industry norm that would otherwise had been 
established in an opaque process. This is not meant to suggest that SDO processes always meet 
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the transparency standards required; on the contrary, formal standard-setting processes can also 
raise questions of procedural fairness and stakeholder representation.130 
In turn, there may be many reasons for stakeholders to interrupt standardization processes 
of a (formal) SDO for the sake of resuming them elsewhere, often in newly forged consortia. 
Most common is indeed the instinctive reaction to a slow and time-consuming standards 
development process, reluctance of fellow standardizers to implement a tiebreaking rule, and 
a sense of a collective action failure. This is especially the case in formal organizations with 
large and diversified membership, where getting the majority of stakeholders on the same page 
demands a frantic effort and often goes at the costs of time;131 the latter is often a scarce 
resource in the realm of technology. Opting for a faster process may hence increase the 
likelihood of standard’s technical appropriateness and wide acceptance.  
Companies wishing to bypass rigid operational rules of formal SDOs have three options at 
their disposal: promoting their proprietary specifications as de facto standards; initiating a 
parallel standardization procedure in another existing SDO; or creating a new consortium.132 
Companies opting for the first strategy may run the risk of lacking critical mass for industry-
wide proliferation of their standard, especially when competing technologies are available: in 
such setting, collective action failures could be resolved by either a formal SDO or market 
forces, which, however, are sometimes hard to predict. For instance, the ITU managed to 
achieve a better result in standardization of 56K modems than two competing consortia due to 
the support from all major market players and successful resolution of patent issues.133 In this 
regard, even though the market success of standards crafted in a committee-based process is 
equally challenging to predict,134 the mere fact that multiple companies have invested in 
standard’s definition increases its network effects, and hence its chances of wide industry 
endorsement.  
Amid the trade associations and societies of professionals, standardization bodies have 
proven intriguing from an institutional standpoint: driven by collaborative efforts of their 
voluntary membership, SDOs lack any dire punishment for abandoning their fora,135 leaving 
standardization “outsiders” to the discretion of the market. Along similar lines, members are 
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under no obligation to stand by the organization they have selected at the outset of a standard-
setting activity – at least in theory.136 Hence, when switching costs are relatively low, the 
abundance of SDOs make for a significant number of alternatives for stakeholders to move to 
or carry on their interaction.   
In more generalized terms, the organizational landscape of most SDOs allows their 
stakeholders ample room for maneuver. Standards that are proprietary or have emerged in 
informal processes may be endorsed by recognized organizations in the so-called “fast” or 
“fast-track procedure,” when a technical document is directly submitted for the (final) 
approval, sidestepping technical deliberations in working groups. ETSI Publicly Available 
Specification (PAS) process allows partner-organizations to propose their technical 
specification for an adoption as an ETSI Technical Specification or Technical Report.137 
Consortia specifications can be ratified as CEN/CENELEC deliverables in a Unique 
Acceptance Procedure (UAP) that combines both public enquiry and a voting phase.138 In ISO 
and in its counterpart, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), with which ISO 
shares the same operational framework, the draft standard may be presented either at the 
enquiry stage or at the approval stage (provided that the SDO submitting the proposal is 
recognized by the ISO Council).139  
A few notable examples include Linux specifications for operating systems, which were 
subject to such ex post endorsement and converted into the ISO/IEC 23360 standard;140 the 
Java software, which was proposed by Sun Microsystems as a long-term solution in one of ISO 
Technical Committees;141  color management specifications of the International Color 
Consortium, which served as a blueprint for IEC 61966-series;142 and the Open Document 
Format for Office Applications (ODF) created by OASIS, which was formally adopted by ISO 
in 2006.143 Remarkably, shortly after the ODF/ISO 26300 standard was presented to the global 
community, Microsoft submitted a competing proposal for XML-based specifications, 
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claiming that that ODF/ISO standard did not give due considerations to the legacy of Microsoft 
Office documents;144 this led to the emergence of the second ISO-endorsed standard for XML-
based file format, the OOXML/ISO 29500, in 2008.145 
In a similar vein, consortia specifications have been submitted for the formal ratification to 
the IEEE SA Standards Board. Standards for electronic design automation (EDA), are crafted 
within the Accellera Systems Initiative and, upon the approval of the consortium, transferred 
to the IEEE-SA for further considerations and eventually, to the IEEE SA Standards Board for 
final approval.146 The IEEE P1801 standard for low power design is a result of this type of 
ratification.147 Likewise, Bluetooth specifications for wireless data transfer, developed by the 
Bluetooth SIG, were approved by the Standards Board as an IEEE 802.15.1 standard.148 
Following the IEEE cooperation program with IEC, an IEEE standard may subsequently be 
submitted to the IEC for formal recognition.149  
For this reason, initiating a parallel standardization process in a different SDO, or even in 
another working group of the SDO that originally hosted the project,150 may seem a plausible 
solution from a strategic viewpoint. In practice, however, few companies would agree to 
duplicate their effort and exploit their resources on two similar projects, despite the flexibility 
of SDOs’ rules of participation;151 for industry representatives, a single standard-setting process 
secures efficient allocation of expertise and capital and spares lengthy business deliberations. 
Empirical evidence suggests that parallel standardization processes have rarely been managed 
by the same actors.152  
Accordingly, the most probable scenario to escape formal SDO processes would be setting 
up a consortium or an interest group, tailored for a specific standardization project. It comes as 
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no surprise that this type of strategy was commonly employed by companies that were 
dissatisfied with the process in SDOs originally hosting their standardization project. Indeed, 
some evidence from the survey among industry stakeholders, conducted in the JRC report 
mentioned earlier, suggested that this strategy has been used in practice by stakeholders that 
did not agree with SDOs’ patent policies.153 At the same time, when resulting in “forum-
shopping,” switching standardization forum may be an important indicator of inefficiency of 
SDOs policy design, explaining why SDOs are indeed subject to institutional competition in 
the market for standard-setting;154 yet, whether policy making in SDOs is constrained by the 
existence of alternative standardization platforms is yet to be proven empirically. The examples 
that follow illustrate the practice of “forum-shifting” in SDOs with different institutional 
design. 
 
2. Examples of forum-shifting 
At the dawn of standardization of telecommunications technologies, when the attempts of 
ITU to define a global standard for mobile cellular radio proved fruitless, a group of mobile 
networks operators, joined forces in the Group Special Mobile, established by the European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CEPT) in 1981 and which later 
evolved into ETSI.155 It took the experts almost a decade and a half to set up an industry 
consortium to represent their interests: the GSM Association was formally established in 1995. 
In 2015, when a number of companies announced their interest to standardize LTE technology 
for unlicensed spectrum, they did not launch the project in 3GPP, the body maintaining LTE 
and 4G specifications, since the use of unlicensed spectrum may not have been supported by 
all members of the SDO;156 instead, they set up the MulteFire Alliance, whose operational 
framework largely mimicked the one shared between ETSI and 3GPP.157 Interests of mobile 
operators participating in 3GPP activities were also represented in other consortia such as the 
Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) and the ORAN Alliance (the latter targeted at 
fostering the use of open standards in the RAN). 
Examples of industry interest groups that have also been formed by members of so-called 
“private” SDOs or even consortia abound. The Near Field Communication (NFC) Forum was 
shaped in 2003 by IEEE members (Nokia, Sony and Philips/NXP) in order to develop short-
range wireless interaction specifications for electronic devices.158 The emergence of USB 
specifications and the USB Implementers Forum was in part driven by the licensing rules of 
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the competing FireWire standard promulgated by IEEE.159 A number of companies involved 
in the Internet of Things standardization transferred their work from ICANN to the newly 
established IPSO Alliance, explaining this shift by ICANN’s alleged inability to draft rules that 
would satisfy the internet community, but also its failure to secure funding from the US 
government.160 Stakeholders that were not entirely satisfied with the DVB Project’s work on 
CI standard created a forum to develop CI Plus specifications, which was subsequently brought 
back to DVB.161 
Even more remarkable was the switch of HTML mark-up language standardization from 
the W3C to the Web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group (WHATWG), formed 
in 2004 specifically for this occasion by the then three web giants, Apple, Mozilla and Opera.162 
The underlying reason was the loss of interest of the majority of W3C membership in the 
further development of HTML specification, and their focus on its XML-based equivalent, the 
XHTML; yet, some testimonies also suggest the struggle of W3C community in resolving the 
frictions around IPR issues.163 As it was the case for DVB and CI Plus standard, and for 
standards crafted in WiGig, the work on HTML5 specification was later on brought back to 
W3C. Ironically, W3C itself was formed by a group of stakeholders who left web 
standardization in IETF because of its adverse patent policy, as well as a consensus-driven and 
cumbersome process.164  
Despite its popularity, the recourse to informal standardization methods often appears 
temporary, since SDOs enable submission of matured specifications through the fast-track 
procedure. Accordingly, forum shifting is not always a compelled course of action, but rather 
a consequence of careful, strategic calculations: a standard created in multiple platforms will 
benefit from both fast-track development in informal settings and fast-track endorsement by a 
recognized authority. By holding multi-organizational membership, stakeholders possess the 
necessary knowledge to anticipate the institutional costs of quitting a formal standardization 
process and catching the right moment to ratify the standard that has already been shaped. 
Above all, forum shifting is a strategy worth exploring by stakeholders opposing collective 
decisions, or failure to take any, by their forum.  The remainder of this section describes how 
this type of approach was employed in the 802.11 Working Group.  
 
3. Shifting to consortia standardization in 802.11 IEEE 
  
i. The development of 802.11n 
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The evolution of Wi-Fi technologies has sparked the interest of academia for quite some 
time. What started as an unpromising set of specifications operating at a slow speed and 
supported by scarcely any electronic devices had soon advanced into the leading technology 
that would reshape the entire wireless industry.165 The historic breakthrough took place in 2003, 
when the 802.11g version of WLAN standard was finally ratified. However, even this 
innovative set of specifications required an update to cope with the dynamic changes in market 
demand; the 802.11n version was to be delivered in 2007. Unlike its predecessors, the new 
standard featured Multiple-Input Multiple – Output (MIMO) antennas, enabling silicon chips 
on which the standard was running to handle multiple data signals simultaneously. As an 
optional function, it enabled operation on the 5 GHz frequency band, in contrast to the 
“traditional” 2.4 GHZ band, which was shared with household appliances, such as microwaves 
and the Bluetooth technologies.  
Dual-band and MIMO promised faster speed, better operating distance and superior 
wireless connection, while being perfectly backwards compatible and following similar 
principles as previous versions of 802.11. In anticipation of a new standard, some hardware 
manufacturers and wireless routing companies had already launched the production of 
compatible devices and obtained certification from the Wi-Fi Alliance, based on what was still 
merely a draft specification.166 The industry was enthralled by the new standard: what lacked 
was its formal adoption. Yet, endless discussions within 802.11 working group have been to 
no avail: the ratification date shifted from 2007 to 2008 and eventually, to 2009, when the IEEE 
SA Standards Board approved the draft standard as an 802.11n Wireless LAN.167  
If the standard was that much awaited, why did its development take so long? Moreover, 
what was the tiebreaker in the myriad technical meetings? To begin with, in lieu of initiating 
the project from a scratch, the 802.11n Task Group preferred to issue a call for proposals. Out 
of four complete proposals submitted for the Task Group’s consideration,168 two were selected: 
one outlined by the World-Wide Spectrum Efficiency (WWiSE) group and another by the 
TGnSync.169 The debate ranged fiercely about licensing of intellectual property embedded in 
the new standard. Among the supporters of the first proposal, the idea of RAND-zero licensing 
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pooled much better: largely comprised of the industry “veterans,”170 WWiSE expected zero-
licensing policy to level playing field and restore the market position of the 802.11b 
frontrunners. In turn, RAND-zero would not fit the business model of the “newcomers” from 
TGnSync, who wished to realize their R&D investments.171  
Technical features of the standard were also a subject of disagreement. While marginally 
similar, TGnSync proposal was mainly focused on standard’s implementation: it required 
numerous different link rates and introduced many optional features, such as the increase of 
the channel size from 20MHz to 40MHz. In contrast, WWiSE proposal was less 
comprehensive, and its supporters were more than satisfied with 20MHz channel size and only 
six mandatory link rates, which also allowed keeping the costs rather low. In the end, the 
Working Group decided to continue with the TGnSync’s proposal; yet when it came to the 
voting, the proposal failed to achieve the required 75% of positive votes, receiving only 51% 
in the first voting round, and 49% in the second.172 
As it appeared that the development of 802.11n was foundering, Intel and Broadcom, 
although belonging to different camps, joined forces to establish a consortium outside the 
formal Task Group. The Enhanced Wireless Consortium (EWC) was set up in 2005 with the 
purpose to accelerate the development and ratification of 802.11 and later joined by other 
chipmakers and consumer electronics manufacturers.173 Once developed and adopted within 
the EWC, the new WLAN specification was submitted as a joined proposal to the IEEE 
802.11n Task Group where it passed unanimously.174 What seems quite jarring is that, while 
the issue of optional features largely contributed to the Task Group members reaching an 
impasse, the final specification included even more optional features than the WWiSE and 
TGnSync together. Although the project eventually resulted in the adoption of a standard, some 
authors have also argued that the establishment of the EWC consortium has significantly 
affected standardization of 802.11n by essentially hijacking the process.175 
ii. DensiFi in TGax 
 
A more recent incident in 802.11 Working Group that illustrated forum-shifting in the 
development of 802.11ax standard dealt with the establishment of a Special Interest Group 
(SIG) named DensiFi by about 20 members of the Working Group.176 Although the reason to 
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173 The total of 27 companies included Apple, Azimuth, Atheros, Airoha, Buffallo, Conextant, Cisco 
Systems, D-Link, Lenovo, LitePoint, Marvell, NETGEAR, SANYO, Symbol Technologies, Sony, and 
Toshiba.  
174 184 to 0, with four abstentions.  
175 DeLacey et al., supra note 168. 
176 There were three other SIG groups noted in the Chair report, so apparently the practice is not so 
uncommon. What was uncommon was that SIG was essentially dominating the process against IEEE rules.  




bring the discussion outside the IEEE was not directly connected to IEEE’s policy revision, 
this case is a fitting example for the purpose of our research since it sheds some light onto 
potential antitrust violations arising from forum shifting. DensiFi was allegedly established to 
expedite the work on 802.11ax standard;177 the work of the SIG was conducted parallel to, and 
even ahead of, the work of TGax, the task force in charge of developing the 802.11ax 
standard.178 The SIG was identified as being relatively closed and difficult to join by new 
members, and governed by only a few members who determined the course of action. During 
the Task Group meetings, DensiFi members were voting as individual members of TGax, 
which allowed them to block other proposals while favoring their own.179  
It is the exclusion of some technical proposals because of the voting by DensiFi members 
that was the ground for a complaint from a Task Group member.180 The complaint induced the 
Working Group chair to commence a  formal investigation of the SIG, which found that 
members breached internal IEEE rules prohibiting dominance of standardization processes 
through ‘“superior leverage, strength or representation” with the effect of excluding 
viewpoints of non-SIG participants from “fair and equitable consideration” within the 
802.11ax Task Group.’181 As a remedy, IEEE SA restricted the voting rights of DensiFi 
members in TGax to a single collective vote,182 and when therefore, many companies started 
to withdraw from the SIG; DensiFi was finally disbanded in 2016. Curiously, the matter also 
gained the attention of the DoJ for antitrust concerns related to an attempt to exclude 
technologies from incorporation into standards; in particular, DoJ appeared interested in the 
role of standards group in policing the alleged abuse of dominance. To this day, the DoJ has 
not yet issued any statement pertinent to DensiFi activity in TGax.   
4. Forum-shifting as Voice  
The failure to agree on patent policy cannot be considered as the only reason behind the 
delay of 802.11n standardization. Advancement of wireless industry did not stall or shrink after 
802.11g specifications had been adopted; quite the opposite, the continuous pace of 
                                                   
 
177 See https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/north-america/doj-probes-role-
of-special-interest-group-in-new-wifi-standard (accessed on 20 September 2019). Note that there is no 
public website or public information on DensiFi. Report: 802.11ax dominance complaint, para 4. 
178 See In the Matter of the Appeal of Ericsson, Graham Smith and InterDigital, Appellant’s Appeal Brief, 
5 January 2017, A-3, available at:  
http://www.ieee802.org/appeal_decisions/Ericsson_Smith_InterDigital_17_0106/Appeal_Brief_and_Appe
ndix_SASB_Appeal_(2017.01.05).pdf (accessed on 20 September 2019).  
179 From the Report on the 802.11ax dominance complaint (Investigation), November 2016, p. 13 (available 
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companies. Several individuals commented that there was an implicit expectation that once a document was 
agreed in the SIG, that members would act in accordance with the interest of the group and not argue 
anymore about it, and support it in IEEE 802.11. It was also noted that once members had been part of the 
discussion around a document, they would naturally be more likely to support the included proposal”. 
180 See supra note 178; Dominance allegation in TGax, 16 June 2016, complaint by Graham Smith received 
by WG Chair, available at: https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/16/11-16-0784-00-0000-
dominanceallegation-in-tgax.doc (accessed on 20 September 2019). 
181 See supra note 178, at A-3. 
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technological development reshaped the industry as it was known in the end of the 20th century, 
and new players have paved their way for global markets.183 The 802.11n standard ran on more 
technologies than its predecessors did: this is not only evident from the complexity of its 
technical features, but also from the fact that the number of LoAs submitted to IEEE SA soared 
dramatically with the introduction of 802.11n.184 As the standard embedded a significantly high 
number of patent claims, disagreements on licensing terms for 802.11n essential technologies 
were not unexpected. Repeated calls for missing LoAs during working group’s meetings,185 
cases as Ericsson v D-Link, Microsoft v Motorola Mobility, and the famous “patent troll” In re 
Innovatio IP Ventures186 illustrate the legal skirmishes over 802.11n patents, which exerted a 
significant effect on the wireless industry.   
The recourse to a consortium during 802.11n development did not put an end on 
uncertainties around patent licensing for 802.11 standards, nor did it prevent any future 
disputes on this matter. What it did, however, was resolving a collective action problem: once 
the workable solution was on the table, all stakeholders seemed to approve it, which is indicated 
by the high approval rate of the EWC proposal in 802.11n Task Group. Similarly, the creation 
of WHATWG was driven by the lack of agreement among stakeholders regarding the future 
of standardization work within the W3C. Yet, both groups eventually returned to the SDO they 
stemmed from, although for entirely different reasons: WHATWG was invited to bring their 
work on HTML5 in W3C when the latter realized the failure of the XTML project187 and EWC, 
similarly to DensiFi, in fact, never intended to pursue 802.11 standardization in isolation from 
the IEEE process. At present, members of MulteFire do not exclude the option of bringing their 
technical specifications under the consideration of 3GPP.188  
Hirschman’s framework anticipates that upon perceiving a drop in quality, a quality-
sensitive consumer would be subject to an immediate choice of “creating a fuss” or switching 
to a comparable service provider. Although at first blush the phenomena of forum switching 
would be classified as “exit” based on Hirschman’s conceptual framework, we argue that this 
strategy represents “voice”, since a formal exit has not been exercised. Many reasons for that 
could be mentioned. At the outset, such consortia do not intend to replace an SDO; they are 
tailor-made for specific, limited standardization activity, while SDOs embody numerous 
standards projects. Second, members create those consortia when they disagree with one or 
                                                   
 
183 For instance, Airgo networks was for a long time the only company shipping chipsets for use of MIMO 
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Broadcom.  
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186 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 921 F.Supp.2d 903 (2013). 
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authors. 




several aspects of the standardization process, while they maintain their SDO membership 
status: in principle, nothing precludes both memberships from coexisting.189 Third, this strategy 
appears to be invoked when a limited number of members (often, but not necessarily, belonging 
to a certain group such as network operators or browser companies) disagree, as it was the case 
with IEEE 802.11n Task Group, and act upon the “murmurs” of “horizontal voice”.190 
Fourthly, such a measure allows for the possibility of “gravitating back” to the SDO, project 
‘vertical voice’, and benefit from the SDO’s ability to provide further validation.  
There is indeed some evidence suggesting that stakeholders who were not happy with 
patent policies of some SDOs would be moving to other SDOs; yet, exiting seemed only an 
available option in the beginning of the standardization activity, since later on, switching costs, 
path dependence and IPRs do not allow for an exit as such, and members would prefer to create 
an alternative forum. The absence of barriers to entry and the potential competition from new 
SDOs would then act as a check on an SDO’s ability to impose policies running counter to the 
interests of its members, even if an SDO faces no competition from SDOs currently active in 
its field. On the other hand, standards development may be tied to specific SDOs, and can only 
migrate to other SDOs at a substantial cost. These switching costs include the cost of 
coordinating with other SDO members, as well as the loss of organizational and reputational 
capital. However, the value of repeated interaction and reputation are built over time, and 
cannot be easily reproduced in a different organization, which would imply a type of ‘lock-in’ 
effect for certain SDOs. SDO members may thus face significant difficulties in migrating their 
standards development projects to a different organization when they are unhappy about a 
policy revision at a particular SDO. 
Quite crucially, this type of voice may be prevented by legal constraints under which SDOs 
operate, such as those imposed by antitrust law, as illustrated by the example of DensiFi. By 
forming a group outside the SDO and then re-joining the work within SDOs committees, 
members risk to exert undue dominance in standards development processes191 and hence may 
breach the relevant antitrust provisions prohibiting conspiracy and abuse of dominance. 
Accordingly, SDO participants willing to “step out of the room” should give due consideration 
to the applicable legal framework, including the type of margin for maneuver it allows for.   
 
B. Refusal to follow new rules  
Although rules of SDOs are binding once participants sign a membership agreement, 
expulsion from membership occurs rarely, if ever. For instance, members and participants of 
an SDO are expected to disclose and license their technologies within the discretion provided 
by the SDO’s rules of intellectual property. This obligation also applies, all thing being equal, 
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once those rules have been modified. However, SDOs typically do not consider the refusal to 
follow new licensing rules as a reason for expulsion: stakeholders that do not commit to license 
their technology risk that their technology will not be adopted into a standard,192 as well as 
reputational consequences.193 On the other hand, the possibility to disobey or opt out from 
following the new rules allows dissatisfied stakeholders to remain within the SDO and to try 
to minimize the impact of the rules with which they disagree.  
 
1. Submission of LoAs in 802.11 working group 
Most studies on the consequences of the new IEEE Patent Policy reveal that the new 
licensing requirements are not adhered to by all patent-owners: more specifically, companies 
that were openly opposing the changes seemed to keep their promise not to provide any 
licensing commitments under the new policy.194 These studies use the fluctuations in the 
amount and nature of submitted LoAs as a prong to assess the effect(s) of the revised policy 
on IEEE standardization activity and the industry.   
Drawing upon existing research, we consider refusal to provide LoAs, or submission of 
negative LoAs, as one of the strategies that stakeholders may exercise to voice their 
disagreement with an SDO’s patent policy. To that end, we examined the LoAs for 802.11 
standard series submitted to IEEE SA PatCom in the period of 2013 – 2017 (which counts for 
all LoAs submitted in 2015 and two years prior and after the new rules took effect). Given that 
the analysis of LoAs has already been performed in the previous studies on the topic, our 
examination is limited to the identification of positive and negative LoAs, and the stakeholders 
submitting them.195  
This exercise allows us to observe the following. First, what stands out when we look at all 
LoAs for 802.11 standard series is the fact that there were almost no negative LoAs submitted 
to PatCom before January 2016. The only exception was a negative commitment from Ruckus 
Wireless Inc. submitted in October 2010 for 802.11v and which so far remains the company’s 
only patent claim for 802.11 technology.196 The number of negative LoAs has indeed surged 
as of 2016, which appears to be the start of a period of increased activism: yet, January 2016 
alone may appear as a strikingly delayed moment in time for opponents to express their 
disagreements in the form of negative LoAs given that the new patent policy took effect already 
in March 2015.197  
At the same time, the total number of submitted LoAs was significantly higher in 2015, but 
more than a half of those LoAs (17 out of 31) were submitted by a single stakeholder during 
                                                   
 
192 Contreras on W3C case (VoiceXML, see infra.) 
193 Reputational losses may many times determine behavior in relational markets. See also R. Benabou and 
J. Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 5, 1652 (2006). 
194 i.e. negative LoAs from Nokia, Ericsson and Qualcomm. 
195 See Annex II. 
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Communications System in 2016 and then by Arris Group in 2017. 
197 In the next sub-heading we offer at least three explanations for this delay.  




the transition period between the former and the latest patent policy. Perhaps, these LoAs might 
be interpreted as a restatement of support to the IEEE Patent Policy, since the stakeholder that 
provided them is known to have been openly advocating in favor of the new rules. In general, 
the number of submitted LoAs does not seem to correlate to any milestones in standards 
development or approval,198 which in a way strengthens the assumption that the increased 
number of LoAs in 2015 is attributable to the IEEE patent policy change.199 The fact that since 
September 2014, when the Ad Hoc Committee of PatCom has already been drafting the new 
patent policy, outstanding LoAs became a frequent topic of the full 802.11 working group 
meetings likewise exemplifies stakeholders’ reluctance to accept modifications to licensing 
rules.200  
That said, negative licensing commitments, although naturally causing uncertainty among 
the members in the working group, do not by definition lead to stagnation of a standard-setting 
activity. In the case of IEEE, the negative licensing commitments causes uncertainty owing to 
differences in opinions on the applicability of the current (2015) or the prior (2007) version of 
the patent policy (as noted in minutes of PatCom’s June 2018 meeting which was subsequently 
refined in the December 2018 minutes).  When the holder of a patent essential for VoiceXML 
standard did not commit to provide licenses on royalty-free term, which it should have done 
follow the patent policy of W3C, the working group nevertheless decided to proceed with the 
adoption of the standard; despite the lack of licensing commitment, the patent-holder has never 
actually sought royalties for that particular technology.201 Additionally, the promulgation of 
new standards, although delayed, did not seem to lose all its traction: indeed, recently, 802.11ai 
and 802.11ah were adopted despite the negative LoAs submitted for those standards.202  
 
2. LoAs as Voice  
If one views the submission of negative LoAs through the prism of Hirschman’s theory, 
such action could be regarded as yet another articulation of a voice strategy, and closer to a 
‘faint grumbling’ rather than a ‘violent protest’. At the same time, it is a form of complaining 
                                                   
 
198 Annex I and the IEEE 802.11 Working Group Project Timelines, available at 
http://www.ieee802.org/11/Reports/802.11_Timelines.htm (last accessed 24 March 2019), which 
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that exemplifies a quintessential activist behavior inextricably linked to voice, which tests the 
tolerance and patience of the organization – and its members that are negatively affected. 
Negative LoA’s are also representative of the different attitudes of the diverse members to the 
patent policy changes, and an indicator of the member’s perception of their influence and 
bargaining power. For the ‘quality-sensitive’ members who would otherwise be expected to be 
swift in exiting per Hirschman’s framework, the submission of negative LoAs also appears to 
suggest that the exit option does not seem to be readily available or rather is too expensive.203  
This raises the question as to why the LoAs were submitted with a significant delay post 
the revision of the patent policy, if indeed the members wanted to raise their voice. Indeed, 
January 2016 seems to present a riddle (Annex II), as one would expect negative LoAs to be 
submitted already in 2015. A possible explanation is that members only submitted such LoAs 
at that time because earlier there was no need to submit one, which would mean that members 
would choose to have their voice heard once there was a need for that, and not when the rules 
changed. Such a choice would not weaken the strength of their voice nor its effectiveness. To 
corroborate this view, those who submitted LoAs are still actively involved in the meetings. A 
combination of voice and loyalty seems to be driving the members here, if not the consideration 
of voice for now, and postponement of exit. 
An alternative explanation would be that the turn in the patent policy heralded a period of 
confusion as to which IP-related legal framework applies to each standard project that is 
ongoing or was concluded prior to the patent policy change. Indeed, the most recent minutes 
of the IEEE Standards Board meeting of June 2019 corroborate this view, as it appears that 
IEEE members were still considering collectively of potential ways to address potential 
misunderstandings with a view to clarifying the licensing landscape.204 Crucially, this 
collective thinking and mutual, evolutionary learning could also be linked to and be the result 
of a combination of voice and loyalty. After all, loyalty is a commitment device which, in times 
of crisis or other turning points, leads members to use voice and attempt to influence or instigate 
well-calculated change instead of exiting the organization.205 In order for such change to occur, 
a ‘wait-and-see’ approach may be employed, whereby inert members create the necessary 
cushion for repairing performance lapses. Interestingly, inertia can also be the precursor of 
evolution or else the creation of a ‘new normal’ or a new equilibrium reached by members 
through a broad consensus whereby voice faints, exit does not happen and loyalty is the main 
driver for evolution. 
Yet another, but related to the previous although less benign, explanation could have to do 
with the period of out-of-court litigation that followed the patent policy change in 2015 and the 
ensuing IEEE reaccreditation process (which is mandatory for all ANSI-accredited standards 
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developing organization when there is a policy chance).206 Only when this external period of 
litigation ended, discontented IEEE members relocated their voice-related efforts internally, 
by filling LoAs as a final resort to express their opposition to the policy.  
It is submitted that filling negative LoAs can be an unexpectedly effective manner of raising 
voice in this area of SEP-dependent standard-setting, which could under certain circumstances 
bring about institutional change and, potentially, return to the previous regime. Although ANSI 
re-accredited IEEE as a whole, the continuous voice articulation within the organization had a 
- surprising for some – turn recently within ANSI. Acting as gatekeeper for standards 
development in line with basic tenets of due process and, arguably, a powerful, exogenous and 
neutral arbiter of the overall validity and legal value of standard-setting activity, ANSI Board 
of Standards Review (BSR) was requested to approve the first two IEEE standards created 
under the new IEEE patent policy: IEEE 802.11ah-201x, focusing on lower energy 
consumption and connectivity of IoT devices, and IEEE802.11ai-201x relating to improved 
connectivity in demanding environments such as stadiums and shopping malls.207  
These two standards build on the primary WiFi standard, 802.11 and reflect years of work 
by the IEEE engineers and other members. In a highly uncommon move, the BSR declined to 
approve the two standards and contended that it will not promote these standards in any 
international standard-setting forum such as the ISO or JTC1, fueling the existing uncertainty 
as to the licensing-related landscape in this rapidly evolving and highly volatile area of 
standardization.208 While details remain to become known, it appears that ANSI BSR’s 
decision was premised on the worrisome presence of negative – or even missing – LoAs by 
crucial SEP holders. For both standards, several companies, including Nokia, Ericsson, and 
KPN, refused to license their SEPs on the new terms.  
The debate about the role, value, permissible content and reach as well as effects of 
statements of assurance by SEP holders becomes increasingly heated. In the short run, it 
appears that a broader discussion has started about the compatibility with the broader ANSI 
patent policy of ASD IP policy relating to so-called ‘custom LoAs’, i.e. LoAs with custom 
restrictions not explicitly stated in the ANSI patent policy, but also, quite crucially, the very 
meaning of some of the most controversial terms in ANSI’s patent policy.209 In an era with an 
ever-increasing focus on IP protection as a strategic tool for firms and governments globally, 
the outcome of this discussion could have very important ramifications for many generations 
of standards to come. 
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3. Refusal to Participate as Voice  
Silent abstention from active participation in the proceedings of the working group would 
also be a form of voice or ‘suffering in silence’, which however would seem to be a precursor 
of potential exit in a subsequent time period. The latter could in principle still be avoided not 
only due to exogenous factors (switching costs) but also endogenous factors (flexibility of the 
organization’s institutional framework to accommodate such abstentions; the power of loyalty; 
the continuous existence of leverage within the organization; or a combination of all the above). 
In addition, refusal to participate may also be a strategic choice by certain stakeholders in the 
hope that a revision of the policy will be instigated, a precondition to increase participation and 
approval of processes. For such an activism to be effective, some concerted effort and 
mobilization may be warranted but also some consistency, insisting on the validity of the 
reasons for refusing participation.  
Clearly, from a consumer welfare perspective, such a situation is suboptimal if the refusal 
to participate leads to certain technologies which would otherwise be considered for the 
standard eventually being left out due to fears that no licensing will occur, or licensing terms 
would be excessive. By the same token, a refusal to participate may lead to inferior outcomes 
such as the adoption of lower-quality technologies, thereby failing to incorporate the state of 
the art in a given standard. 
 
C. Delay of standards development – Delays as voice in IEEE 
Standardization activity in IEEE continues in spite of negative LoAs. However, empirical 
evidence discussed in this Article suggested that the development of 802.11ai and 802.11ah 
standards took longer than anticipated due to the uncertainty caused by the new patent 
policy.210 Similarly, it was implied that the late adoption of 802.11n was in a part caused by 
companies owning patents for 802.11g, but whose technologies were not implemented in the 
future standards version.211 In this regard, delay, disruption or interruption of standard-setting 
process because of adverse IPR rules may be considered as another strategy for actors to raise 
their voice and protest within an SDO. Such procrastination entails sunk costs not only for 
those who try to lobby for the fitness of their own technology but also for the buyers of this 
technology.  
In further considerations, however, the probability that stakeholders will employ this 
strategy is relatively low. Given that only about a quarter of standards produced by an SDO 
gain wide market acceptance, the timing of standards adoption is essential. On one hand, 
standardization that takes place before the industry has adopted to new technologies risks low 
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rate of standards implementation;212 on the other hand, standards adopted later than industry 
expectations may suffer from competition from another standardization project, which is 
detrimental to stakeholders who bet on it, or may give erroneous innovation signals. This is of 
particular concern to the owners, since its failure may result in revenue loss, but also for 
implementers who have to redesign their products specifications during the process of 
standards creation. In other words, by delaying standardization processes, stakeholders may 
shoot themselves in the foot and negatively affect their own business, which for a long time 
was based on a collaborative effort within the standardization forum and on a ‘balance of terror’ 
that would allow for the identification of a broadly acceptable standard to the detriment of 
short-term, opportunistic behavior by any stakeholder.  
At this point, there is no clear evidence that the authors are aware of which shows that this 
strategy has been used by stakeholders opposing the licensing model of an SDO. Moreover, 
the timeline of 802.11 working group suggests that standards development time became 
lengthier as technologies evolved.213 This perhaps also could explain the internal drivers for 
loyalty; especially as Hirschman cautions that “the most loyalist behavior” holds the possibility 
of retaining an “enormous dose of reasoned calculation”. With this lens, we may ignore the 
members who are insensitive to the changes to the patent policy, or lack the capability to 
perceive the impacts of such changes. However, for other discerning members the “reasoned 
calculation” could be driven by multiple considerations, a few being: significance attached to 
contributions in prior standards releases or parallel initiatives; a preference for free-riding; a 
preference emerging from the cognizance of one’s leverage at the SDO, and the ambit of the 
SDO, hoping for quick reversal of course; a ‘fiduciary’ commitment to the cause of pursuing 
the intent of standard-setting activities, which is especially the case in IEEE SA, as the 
members are expected to act in personal capacity or on behalf of the SDO’s objectives; perhaps 
an exhibition of restraint as it could add to desirability for holding “policy” functions in the 
executive bodies in the future. 
 
D. Litigation as voice (and expression of loyalty) 
Complaining is a quintessential feature of a voice strategy. Such a feature can find 
expression in any forum that is available within an organization, be it the board, the general 
assembly or an ordinary meeting. Within an SDO, which must abide by certain procedural due 
process guarantees according to the generally applicable principles of standardization, a 
complaint can take a formal character through the launch of a formal procedure before an 
appeal body. Such an action is not only an expression of voice but also an important 
manifestation of loyalty. Loyalty is here manifested through recourse to the constitutional 
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processes guaranteed under the organization’s relevant formal procedures in case of specific 
objections.  
Within the IEEE, the procedural guarantees in place accommodate a right to appeal to those 
adversely affected by a standard or by the lack of action in any part of the IEEE standardization 
process.214 Such procedures are significant for the rule of law and due process within an SDO, 
as the recent DensiFI episode discussed at length earlier has amply demonstrated. A right to 
complain and by implication a credible system for resolving disputes is an insurance policy for 
those negatively affected and notably those who may have relatively little influence and 
bargaining power within an organization to challenge any potential attempt to capture the 
standardization process. At the same time, a dispute settlement procedure and a right of appeal 
protects the right to be heard and to challenge any frivolous complaints.  
Opponents to the patent policy change voiced twice their objections internally based on this 
right to appeal: once in August and another in September 2014. The IEEE BOG Appeals 
officers rejected both appeals and took issue with the request to form a BOG Appeal Panel, 
finding instead that, contrary to standards development activities, revising the rules pertaining 
to governance such as the rules on the IPR policy applicable in the organization, cannot require 
consensus or in fact the application of the other core values governing standardization 
activities. Interestingly, the IEEE BOG Appeals officers found that all IEEE governing 
committees and other bodies have a fiduciary duty of loyalty which requires that they exercise 
their powers in the best interests of the IEEE, the industry, government and the public.  
Possibilities of having recourse to a quasi-judicial mechanism may be internal to the 
organization but could also include access to a hierarchically superior organization or even to 
State courts. Typically, the latter will be the action of last resort, as most members would enjoy 
the fact that their SDO regime displays a high level of self-containment, insulated by State 
interference to the maximum extent possible.  
Events within the IEEE confirm this theoretical reflection. As noted above, litigation 
regarding the IEEE revised patent policy soon relocated outside the IEEE, this time before the 
gatekeeper of the American standardization system, ANSI. Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson and 
Qualcomm, supported by Fraunhofer, InterDigital, Nokia, Orange, Royal Philips and Siemens, 
challenged IEEE’s re-accreditation process before ANSI on the grounds that the patent policy 
change constitutes a legitimate basis for ANSI to deny accrediting IEEE as a standards 
developer, a process that could have interrupted 35 years of continuous accreditation for 
IEEE.215 While not mandatory, the reputational damage and signaling effect could potentially 
be very serious for IEEE.  
Eventually, ANSI accepted that the revised IEEE patent policy was conform to the ANSI 
patent policy in July 2015 and re-accredited IEEE in September 2015; however, the above-
mentioned companies appealed the decision. In 2016, both the ANSI Executive Standards 
Council (ExSC) and subsequently the ANSI Appeals Board dismissed all appeals challenging 
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IEEE’s reaccreditation, notably by agreeing that the ANSI Essential requirements do not apply 
to the development of an ASD’s procedures such as its patent policy but only relate to standards 
development processes. As noted earlier, the most recent activity shows some intensification 
of the internal pressure once again, this time through the filing of negative LoAs.  
 
E. Taxonomy of Voices 
In what preceded, we identified strategies of voice that members of an SDO could employ 
in the presence of a challenging triggering point which calls for a rethinking of their 
participation strategy. We used IEEE as a striking example where voice strategies but also 
expressions of loyalty were manifested as responses to the recent patent policy change within 
that SDO. In following these developments and series of events, we had recourse back to 
Hirschman’s theory in an attempt to explain particular practices and choices by members.   
Taking inspiration from Helper’s extension of Hirschman’s framework to analyze 
customer-supplier firms relationship strategies,216 we believe that the examples of responses 
of members can be vividly displayed in the graph we present below. ‘Strategic intent’ is 
displayed along the vertical axis, and ‘level of loyalty’ along the horizontal one. In addition, 
‘strategic intent’ has been graduated from low, to balanced to self-serving. Note that ‘self-
serving’ captures members who intend to ‘free-ride’ who are distinct from members who are 
‘indifferent’ to or ‘ignorant’ of the expressed dissent over proposed reforms. Furthermore, the 
level of loyalty has been graduated from low to ‘commitment’ (for members that seem to 
indicate an insistence on ‘sticking with the organization’). Finally, we present a visual means 
of corresponding increase in the costs associated with exercising certain voice options (and 
revisited owing to the nature of repeated interactions) in the realm of standard setting vis-à-vis 
the option to exit given that it is a wide-open possibility.  
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As noted earlier, a crucial element that may well determine the strategy chosen relates to a 
member’s given influence. Members with significant influence will make voice as public as 
possible; they may attempt to organize others so that protest is more effective and takes less 
time. If costs of any type (economic, reputational or other) are significant, then, despite their 
important level of leverage, they may prefer to indicate displeasure through other means such 
as outright refusal to abide with the reformed policy, procrastinate when taking otherwise 
required action, or exercising tangible means of expression such as lowering in attendance. 
Members with influence are more likely to organize complaints and protests in cooperation 
with other members, which presupposes some organizational effort, because they know that 
only then voice can be most effective. Voice entails a romantically optimistic behavior but can 
be severely undermined through exit. The latter is a lonely, silent and rather cost-effective 
strategy. 
Dissenting members with low levels of influence but also low probability of exit could 
indulge in ‘cheap talk’ to force certain policy decisions, or prefer to wait it out hoping to ‘free-
ride’ on the voices of others, or in cases where suitable, opt for silent exit. In this respect, exit 
is a minimalist, noiseless way of expressing dissent; yet it can become noisy if others do 
likewise.217 In both cases (high or low level of influence), loyalty can delay voice but also exit. 
Loyalty can also backfire in an organization that desires to change route or policies 
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fundamentally: for instance, in the case of IEEE, requiring loyalty by its members (in that they 
act in the interest of their organization rather than the interests of their company or their special 
interest) can strengthen the identity of the brand, which thereby becomes a stand-alone entity. 
Nevertheless, loyalty can increase the likelihood of forceful and long-lasting voice in the case 
of a potential sharp decline in the organization or change in substantive policies with important 
negative spillovers. The latter would essentially trigger voice or exit, depending on the level of 
loyalty. 
For influential firms, in addition to commitment to the organization, loyalty is a by-product 
of “reasoned calculation” as seen in the observations by van de Kaa and de Bruijn218 on 
incentives for member firms to display commitment for the organization despite burdensome 
decision-making process. The five incentives identified are - ‘the perspective of future gain’, 
the perspective of enduring gain’, ‘strong voting rules’, ‘a sense of urgency’, and ‘an incentive 
to compromise’. The prevalence of strong voting rules signals rewarding of active 
participation, thus keeping the wheels of decision making well oiled. The sense of urgency 
pertains to the import of achieving consensus as similar efforts might be underway in 
competing standard setting arenas, and that compromises might allow for arriving at a 
settlement in a swifter manner. These five incentives pertain to the decision to stick to the 
consensus driven process of standard setting, despite dissatisfaction with the flaws in the 
decision making process. An undesirable change to the governance norms introduces a sense 
of misalignment pertaining to these incentives, and thus prompting the member firm to re-
assess the costs of staying on with a fresh perspective. Of these five, the last three are of 
significance with respect to our study, as they highlight the operational conditions under which 
the member firms decide on whether to stay committed to the platform or to make a move for 
an equally viable ‘platform’.  
Clearly, the contextual landscape or ecosystem will affect how these dynamics play out. 
For instance, Larouche and Schuett219 in their study on voting rules in SDOs show that 
standard-setting efforts that span over generations of technologies are characterised by repeated 
interaction with a few core members being the dominant IP related contributors in each 
successive generation. Seen in conjunction with the observation of Fleming and 
Waguespack220, and Larrain and Prufer221, that small firms (downstream implementers) 
perceive standard setting as a ‘source of learning’ and a means of gaining from knowledge 
spillovers, such firms are expected to comprise the ‘inert’ members. Such members attach 
significance to the presence of marquee, influential IP-driven members, and are thus not prone 
to exercise voice even if the proposed changes are undesirable.  
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VI. Strengthening the Voice in SDOs: Certain policy suggestions  
Hirschman notes that in the long term, the exit of the members that opt to raise voice in lieu 
of silent exit is deleterious to the welfare of the organization. SDOs could therefore consider 
strengthening the feedback mechanism and investing of significant resources on grievance 
redress mechanisms to lower the ‘costs’ of voicing of discontent, and ultimately dissuade the 
member firms from approaching towards an exit strategy. Since those who voice their 
discontent also look back in the past to determine the approach and behavior of the organization 
to ‘voices’, it augurs well to nurture a working environment in which the voices are accorded 
an avenue to be expressed, deliberated upon, and responded in a collaborative and thorough 
manner. Such measures would facilitate the voicing of ‘quality’ dissent rather than ‘cheap talk’, 
thus furthering legitimacy.222 Addressing demands for legitimacy and credibility sufficiently 
could in fact be a great means to strengthen mutual trust, tame voice in a manageable level and 
ultimately nourish loyalty. For SDOs, which are subject to exogenous pressure from public 
organizations (competition authorities, courts), well-functioning mechanisms that respect a 
certain degree of rule of law, due process and careful balancing of interests are quintessential 
for channeling members towards voice (rather than exit), streamlining voice and avoiding 
public interference.  
More generally, looking carefully into governance structures within SDOs is a daunting 
task that many SDOs, including the IEEE, are yet to set in motion. As noted by Kaa and 
Bruijn,223 and in the JRC report,224 member firms with a strategic outlook are particularly keen 
on having their personnel occupy posts of significance within the SDOs. If the processes for 
expression of grievances is designed well, the member firms would be inclined to voice their 
reservations in a responsible manner, thereby possibly gaining trust, future support and co-
operation of the ‘silent sufferers’, and contributing to the improvement of the quality of 
operations within the SDO. Additionally, a neutral perception of the episode would serve as an 
impetus for the vocal member firms to keep participating. As noted earlier by Kaa and Bruijn, 
and Dowding,225 by the use of repeated interaction, the actors essentially commit to an 
incremental increase in cost – both in tangible and intangible forms. For example, Kaa and 
Bruijn note that for the purposes of consensus based standard-setting, the sudden withdrawal 
of a member firm after having taken on the ‘path of entering’ the process signifies that it was 
unable to commit to the imminent final decision, thus sowing the seeds of mistrust in peers. 
Conversely, if an SDO were to refer to members who voiced objections to policy changes in 
an unsavoury manner, the rest of the members subject to forces of internal coordination and 
information exchange (horizontal voice), are bound to take notice, and prefer non-voice 
options. 
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Furthermore, efforts to nurture voice allow for the beneficial effects of horizontal and 
vertical voice to be leveraged – horizontal voice enables member firms that are ‘rivals’ in 
marketplace to realise that they are similarly minded when it comes to concerns, and facilitates 
collaboration, whilst vertical voice displays evidence of formal mechanisms where the claims, 
pleadings, and responses can be submitted and heard in a measured and calibrated manner. 
Such efforts inevitably serve as inputs for determination of self-assessment of levels of 
influence, and growth for influence, and legitimacy for each member thus contributing to a 
more realistic motive for choosing on consensus, collaboration or compromise on specific 
technologies as part of the standardization strategy. Indeed, Kaa and Bruijn note the importance 
of horizontal voice acting as a catalyst of improvement in cooperation between member firms 
and that it needs to be empirically analyzed as well. 
In addition, as a matter of theoretical constellation, in a highly competitive environment 
such as the standards development ecosystem, one would expect a more careful look into the 
governance structures and the need for due process in the short term. For a consensus-driven 
organization, for instance, it is not always possible to distinguish with sufficient clarity the 
procedural (eg., governance) from the substantive (eg., standards development) issues. 
Theoretical voices have gone as far as to argue that this dichotomy is erroneous and misleading. 
Procedural issues are of substantive importance because they have a significant impact on the 
achievement of the objectives of the organization itself. Thus, if consensus or supermajorities 
are required for the substantive issues then one can require no less for the procedural ones.226 
Within a collaborative, member-driven ecosystem, member firms should invest time and 
effort in making credible contributions in order to be perceived as a voice of significance and 
credibility in times of distress, for perhaps loyalty can oft be measured through the yardstick 
of technical contribution.227 The more the number of such member firms, the higher the 
effectiveness of the exit option, and its emergence as a credible deterrent for the SDOs.228 This 
is notably the case for SDOs where two major groups are formed and their common presence 
is necessary for the SDO to be functional and effective. Thus, how loyalty will influence voice 
and exit also depends on who triggers exit. While in some SDOs, the exit of an important player 
could mean that the existence of those SDOs is no longer justified, in others it could well be 
that the level of interdependence makes voice the only alternative unless a broader level of 
mobilization for exit is achieved. Even so, however, the case for functional and credible voice 
mechanisms remains robust.  
More generally, in a collaborative ecosystem, exit may be a perilous path to take because 
it gives a signal of opportunistic behavior, thereby fueling distrust among peers. It is not 
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uncommon for member firms of one SDO to be members of rival SDOs, consortia, and other 
alliances. It is therefore natural that some members might harbour a fear that the undesirable 
policy change being considered for adoption in SDO of relevance, might compel the rival 
SDOs to adopt a similar stance, a phenomenon that the JRC report coined as ‘contagion’.229 In 
the case of exit, peers may consider that the exiting member no longer deserves to be listened 
to or supported in its protest. These reputation costs cannot be undermined, giving higher 
incentives to use voice instead. Finally, exit may become more (or even too) expensive in the 
case of a shield by a public authority (be it a gatekeeper or a court). Take the case of how IEEE 
SA obtained a favourable endorsement by a BRL from the DoJ’s antitrust division for its 2015 
patent policy change. This also shows that the SDO is adept at anticipating challenges in a 
specific segment, and is able to bring about the required adaptations despite facing significant 
erosion in support.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
This Article’s objective has been to advance the empirical literature relating to 
stakeholders’ behavior notably in the wake of important changes relating to the patent policies 
of the SDO in which they collaborate, and in particular when such changes do not enjoy the 
support of a critical mass of members. It does so by theorizing about this behavior based on a 
conceptual framework developed by Hirschman that attempts to predict under which 
conditions members of an organization in distress will protest (voice), abandon the 
organization (exit) or will suffer in silence (loyalty). In what preceded, we demonstrated that 
this framework is quite apposite for offering an explanation for some of the most complex types 
of behavior that we find in highly collaborative environments such as the one relating to 
technical standard-setting.  
Such exercise is important and novel both at the theoretical and the empirical level. At the 
theoretical level, it constitutes a first attempt to conceptualize reactions to a turning point within 
the highly volatile, rapidly evolving and increasingly interdependent ecosystem of ICT 
standardization. At the empirical level, it identifies instances of distress and how these were 
overcome or not (but also the reasons for such failure) in various SDOs, which allows to 
identify the different facets of voice and loyalty (and their interaction) but also shed light on 
the limits for opportunism and exit in the collaborative ecosystem of ICT standardization. More 
fundamentally, the Article offers some significant insights that justify continuity but also 
much-needed charge or reform within SDOs. 
The Article relied on an example of the recent change in IEEE patent policy to illustrate 
certain strategies that members use as responses to the update. We attempted to contextualize 
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such strategies by using the exit and voice theory by Hirschman (1970). While offering a 
significant conceptual framework, we underlined important nuances and caveats, which may 
call for adaptations of this otherwise amenable framework. We concluded that exit may be 
quite ineffective in certain areas of high R&D expenditure and investment, also because the 
phenomenon of multi-organization membership is pervasive – and probably for good reasons.  
At the same time, in delving a bit deeper into the IEEE recent update of its patent policy, 
we noticed that internal mechanisms and flexibilities emerge to be quite important to 
accommodate the opponents of specific changes. Such mechanisms, while imperfect, may 
under certain circumstances strengthen loyalty to the detriment of exit. In this regard, a 
thorough discussion of the use of LoAs to circumvent unfavorable changes allowed for a better 
understanding of how voice and loyalty can work in this particular SDO setting. Such an 
analysis, while rudimentary in view of the time interval since the policy update, offers 
significant food for thought as to potential reforms and adjustments within SDOs, notably as 
far as reaching critical mass and broad consensus within voluntary, member-driven 
organizations are concerned. Similarly detailed research within other SDOs should be 
encouraged with a view to enriching (or, potentially, rebutting) the evidence collected in 
support of the applicability of the Hirschman framework in the standardization ecosystem. This 
new line of research would ideally incorporate the variable of heterogeneity (both at the 
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802.11ah 04/10/2010 01/09/2016 01/10/2016 07/12/2016 07/12/2016 10/05/2017 
802.11ai 08/12/2010 01/09/2016 01/10/2016 07/12/2016 07/12/2016 31/12/2016 
802.11af 09/12/2009 01/11/2013 01/11/2013 11/12/2013 11/12/2013 21/02/2014 
802.11ac 26/09/2008 01/11/2013 01/11/2013 09/12/2013 11/12/2013 18/12/2013 
802.11ad 10/12/2008 01/07/2012 01/07/2012 23/10/2012 28/12/2012 28/12/2012 
802.11aa 27/03/2008 28/01/2012 17/02/2012 01/06/2012 29/05/2012 29/05/2012 
802.11ae 09/12/2009 20/01/2012 17/02/2012 01/03/2012 31/03/2012 06/04/2012 
802.11s 13/05/2004 01/07/2011 01/07/2011 01/08/2011  01/03/2012 
802.11u 08/12/2004 01/11/2010 01/11/2010 25/02/2011  01/03/2012 
802.11v 08/12/2004 01/11/2010 01/11/2010 09/02/2011  01/03/2012 
802.11z 22/08/2007   01/10/2010  01/03/2012 







802.11p 23/09/2004   15/07/2010  01/03/2012 
802.11w 20/03/2005   11/09/2009  01/03/2012 
802.11n 11/09/2003     11/09/2009   01/03/2012 
802.11y 16/03/2006   06/11/2008  01/03/2012 
802.11r 25/05/2006   09/05/2008  01/03/2012 
802.11k 11/12/2002   09/05/2008  01/03/2012 
802.11e 30/03/2000 22/07/2005 22/07/2005 22/09/2005  08/03/2007 
802.11j 11/12/2002   23/09/2004 02/02/2005 08/03/2007 
802.11i 30/05/2001   24/06/2004 14/02/2005 08/03/2007 
802.11h 07/12/2000   11/09/2003 29/12/2003 08/03/2007 
802.11g 21/09/2000     12/06/2003 20/10/2003 08/03/2007 
802.11d 26/06/1999   14/06/2001 25/10/2001 08/03/2007 
802.11b 09/12/1997     16/09/1999   08/03/2007 
802.11a 16/09/1997     16/09/1999 04/02/2000 08/03/2007 
802.11c 09/12/1997         04/02/2000 




Annex II: Submitted LOAs 2013 -2017232 
 
Month/year Patent-holder LOAs Standard 
Jan-19 Siemens Positive 802.11ax 
Nov-18 InterDigital Negative 802.11ba 
Nov-18 InterDigital Negative 802.11ay 
Nov-18 Ericsson Negative 802.11ai 
Oct-18 Orange Negative 802.11n 
Jun-18 Koninklijke KPN Negative 802.11ah 
Jun-18 Nokia of A Corp Negative 802.11ac 
May-18 Endiio GmbH Positive 802.11ba 
Mar-18 Intel  Positive 802.11ax 
Feb-18 Panasonic Corp Negative 802.11ay 
Feb-18 Facebook Inc. Positive 802.11ay 
Feb-18 Panasonic Corp Negative 802.11ax 
Dec-17 ETRI Positive 802.11ba 
Sep-17 Nokia  Negative 802.11z 
Jun-17 Nokia Tech Oy Negative  802.11ad 
Mar/Apr -17 KAIST Positive 802.11ax 
May-17 Orange  Negative 802.11n 
May-17 Orange  Negative 802.11n 
Mar-17 InterDigital Negative 802.11ax 
Nov-16 IHP Positive  802.11az 
Oct-16 Nokia Tech Oy Negative  802.11ai 
Oct-16 Nokia Tech Oy Negative 802.11ah 
Sep-16  LM Ericsson Negative 802.11ax 
Sep-16  LM Ericsson Negative 802.11ah 
Aug-16 ETRI Positive 802.11ax 
Apr-16 Microsoft  Positive 802.11ai 
Mar-16 Nokia Tech Oy Negative 802.11n 
Jan-16 Nokia Tech Oy Negative 802.11ad 
Jan-16 Nokia Tech Oy Negative 802.11af 
Oct-15 Broadcom Positive 802.11ai 
Jul-15 Samsung El Positive 802.11af 
Jul-15 Samsung El Positive 802.11ac 
Jul-15 Samsung El Positive 802.11ad 
Jul-15 Samsung El Positive 802.11n 
Jul-15 Intel Positive 802.11 
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May-15 Intel Positive 802.11r 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11.2 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11ai 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11ah 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11af 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11ad 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11ac 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11aa 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11z 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11y 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11w 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11v 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11u 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11s 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11r 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11n 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11n 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11k 
Mar/Apr-15 Intel Positive 802.11 
Mar-15 Nokia Tech Positive 802.11 
Mar-15 Nokia Sol &Net Positive  802.11 
Mar-15 AT&T Positive 802.11 
Mar-15 Newracom Positive 802.11ax 
Mar-15 LG EL Positive  802.11aq 
Jan-15 Samsung El Positive  802.11n 
Dec-14 Marvell  Positive 802.11ai 








Jul-14 Wi-Fi One Positive 802.11a/b/e/f/g/h/i/n/
ac 
Jun-14 Toshiba Positive 802.11ad 
Jun-14 Toshiba Positive 802.11ac 
May-14 Siemens Positive 802.11ai 
May-14 Marvell  Positive 802.11ah 
May-14 Marvell  Positive 802.11af 
May-14 Marvell  Positive 802.11ad 
May-14 Marvell  Positive 802.11ac 
Feb/Mar -14 KDDI Corporation Positive 802.11 
Jan/Feb-14 Sony  Positive 802.11af 




Jan/Feb-14 Sony  Positive 802.11ad 
Jan/Feb-14 Sony Positive 802.11ac 
Jan-14 Broadcom Positive 802.11p 
Jan-14 Broadcom Positive 802.11y 
Jan-14 Broadcom Positive 802.11i 
Jan-14 Sony Corporation Positive 802.11-2012 
Jan-14 Cisco Systems Positive 802.11ai 
Oct-13 InterDigital Positive 802.11ai 
Oct-13 InterDigital Positive 802.11ah 
Oct-13 InterDigital Positive 802.11af 
Aug-13 Qualcomm Positive 802.11ai 
Aug-13 LG  Positive 802.11ai 
Aug-13 LG  Positive 802.11ah 
Aug-13 Ericsson Positive 802.11ac 
Aug-13 Broadcom Positive 802.11ah 
Aug-13 Broadcom Positive 802.11af 
Aug-13 Broadcom Positive 802.11ad 
Aug-13 Huawei Positive 802.11ai 
Aug-13 Huawei Positive 802.11ah 
Aug-13 Huawei Positive 802.11ac 
Aug-13 Huawei Positive 802.11i 
Jul-13 Cisco Positive 802.11ak 
Jun/Jul-13 ETRI Positive 802.11ai 
Jun/Jul-13 ETRI Positive 802.11ah 
Jun/Jul-13 ETRI Positive 802.11af 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11ai 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11ah 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11ad 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11ac 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11aa 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11n 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11-2012 
May/Jul-13 Intel Positive 802.11af 
Mar-13 Research In 
Motion 
Positive 802.11ae 
Mar-13 Research In 
Motion 
Positive 802.11aa 
Mar-13 Research In 
Motion 
Positive 802.11z 
Mar-13 Research In 
Motion 
Positive 802.11ad 
Mar-13 Research In 
Motion 
Positive 802.11-2012 




Jan-13 KPN Positive 802.11-2012 
Jan-13 KPN Positive 802.11u 
Jan-13 NEC Positive 802.11ad 
Jan-13 Nokia Positive 802.11ad 
 
  




Annex III: Patent Issues Raised during 802.11 Full Working Group Meetings 2013-2017 
 





Sep-13 LOA request sent TGai 
Nov-13 LOA requests sent 




Sep-14 Outstanding LOAs 
Nov-14 LOA requests with no response 
Jan-15 4 LOAs requests sent 
Mar-15 Outstanding LOAs 
Jul-15233 5 outstanding LOAs 
Sep-15 LOAs request sent Texas A&M University  
Nov-15 5 outstanding LOA  
Jan-16 3 outstanding LOAs 
Mar-16 2 outstanding LOAs 
May-16 No 
Jul-16 2 outstanding LOAs 
Sep-16 LOA request sent TGaz 
Nov-16 1 outstanding LOA 
Jan-17 No 











1 outstanding LOA 
Clarification sought to which parts of 
standards LOAs apply 
1 outstanding LOA 
No 
1 “holder notification” received  
1 outstanding LOA 
2 outstanding LOAs 
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Annex IV: List of Interviews234 
 
1. SDO’s Board member and standards policy director of an innovator-company (skype) 
on January 15, 2018.  
2. IP policy director of an innovator-company (telephone) on January 16, 2018.  
3. SDO’s staff member (skype) on January 12, 2018. 
4. SDO’s Board Member and IP expert formerly employed by multiple manufacturers and 
innovators (WebEx) on January 17, 2018.  
5. SDO’s staff member, January 18, 2018, skype call. 
6. Technical executive specialist of an innovator-company (WebEx) on January 23, 2018.  
7. Manager of Innovator Company (personal meeting) on January 25, 2018.  
8. Research engineer of an innovator company (skype) on February 1, 2018.  
9. Head of standardization unit of an innovator-company (skype) February 7, 2018.  
10. Former head of standardization/IP technology unit of an innovator-
company/independent IP expert (skype) on February 19, 2018.  
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 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3487466 
